Abstract
Persistent heterogeneity and state dependence explain the persistence of criminal offending over time in two distinct ways. The first asserts that offending is persistent over time due to a stable individual trait while the latter suggests that offending has a causal relationship with future crime because it increases the risk of negative consequences. In this chapter, we examine Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) violations to assess which of these explanations is more consistent with corporate crime over time. Using fixed-effects time series analysis (which controls for unobserved heterogeneity), we find an inhibitory effect associated with OSHA inspections, thus challenging the persistent heterogeneity explanation.
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Simpson, S.S., Schell, N. (2009). Persistent Heterogeneity or State Dependence? An Analysis of Occupational Safety and Health Act Violations. In: Simpson, S.S., Weisburd, D. (eds) The Criminology of White-Collar Crime. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09502-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09502-8_4
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