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Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: Regulation through Law

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Digital Media & Intellectual Property

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References

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  4. It is useful to remember that there are at least two other main international treaties that are intended to harmonize copyright law among nations. The first one is the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted in 1886. The other one is the 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPs Agreement). For a positive comment on the WIPO treaties as “a measured and balanced response to the digital age,” see Thomas C. Vinje, The new WIPO Copyright Treaty: a happy result in Geneva, 5 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 230, 230 (1997). For other commentators the treaties represented another step in the Americanization of world copyright law. For general discussion on the point, see Pamela Samuelson, Challenges for the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Council in Regulating Intellectual Property Rights in the Information Age, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 578 (1999); David Vaver, Internationalizing Copyright Law: Implementing the WIPO Treaties, OIPRC Elec. J. Intell. Prop. Rights (1998), http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0199.html. For a general comment, see also Howard P. Goldberg, Note, A Proposal for an International Licensing Body to Combat File Sharing and Digital Copyright Infringement, 8 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 272 (2002), and Silke von Lewinski, WIPO Diplomatic Conference Results in Two New Treaties, 28 Int’l Rev. of Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 203 (1997).

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  10. Many commentators have noticed that the adoption of both acts has been the result of the great content-provider lobbying activity. See, e.g., Rick Boucher, The Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age, in Copy Fights, supra Wayne Crews eds., 2002) note 1, at 95, 97; MacQueen, supra Intro., note 33, at 213; Burk & Cohen, supra ch. 1, note 140.

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  11. Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC).

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  12. Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998).

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  19. Id.

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  29. Council Directive 2001/29, Recital 15, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 11 (EC).

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  30. For this outline, see European Union SCADPLUS service, Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society: The Harmonisation of Certain Aspects (2001), http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26053.htm.

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  31. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 2, 3 and 4 2001 O.J. (L 167) 16 (EC).

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  32. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 16 (EC).

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  33. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6, 7 2001 O.J. (L 167) 17, 18 (EC).

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  34. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 16 (EC).

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  35. Id.

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  36. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 16 (EC).

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  37. See European Union SCADPLUS service, supra note 59.

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  38. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 3(2), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 16 (EC). Under the European concept of “exhaustion” and its U.S. equivalent “first sale” doctrine, the exclusive right of distribution cease after a copyright holder authorizes the first disposal of a copy of the work. A good-faith possessor of the copy can then dispose of it without seeking authorization of the copyright holder. Under the doctrine of first sale, once the copyright owner transfers title to a copy of the copyrighted work to a third party, the third party is entitled to sell or dispose of it without acquiring the copyright owner’s consent. See Margreth Barrett, Intellectual Property — Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights 227 (2000).

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  39. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 7, art. 6 and 8. According to Article 6: “Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of their works through sale or other transfer of ownership.” According to Article 8: “... authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”

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  43. Council Directive 2001/29, Art. 5(3), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 16 (EC).

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  45. The rules on copies for private use have been present for many years in the legislation of a number of countries. For example, such rules were introduced in Italy by Law 93 of 5 February 1992 (entitled: “Norme a favore delle imprese fonografiche e compensi per le riproduzioni private senza scopo di lucro”), as aligned with the standards generally in force in Europe with Legislative Decree 68/2003 transposing Directive 2001/29/EC. See Italian Minister of Innovation and Technologies: Department for Innovation and Technology, Report of the Interministerial Committee on Digital Content in the Internet Age, 22 (2005), http://www.mininnovazione.it/eng/intervento/allegati/rap_cont_dig.pdf. On the levies systems, see P. Bernt Hugenholtz et al., The Future of Levies in the Digital Environment, (2003), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf.

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  46. Council Directive 2001/29, Recital 6, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC).

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  49. Recitals 13 and 47 state that common development and use of technological protection measures and rights management information systems are fundamental, because both technologies give effect to copyright and related rights. See Council Directive 2001/29, Recital 13, 47, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 11, 14 (EC).

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  50. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(3), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 17 (EC).

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  51. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(2), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 17 (EC).

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  52. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(4), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 17-18 (EC).

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  53. The term was first used in Severine Dusollier, Exceptions and Technological Measures in the European Copyright Directive of 2001 — An Empty Promise, 34 Int’l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright 62, 70 (2003).

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  56. Id. at 63.

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  57. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6.4(4), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 18 (EC).

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  58. See Casellati, supra note 94, at 387.

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  59. Greece (entered into force on October 10, 2002), Denmark (enforceable since December 22, 2002), Italy (implemented April 9, 2003), Austria (entered into force on 1st July 2003), Germany (implemented September 13, 2003), Luxembourg (implemented April 29,2004), UK (implemented October 31, 2003), Ireland (implemented January 19, 2004), Netherlands (implemented September 1, 2004). Gasser & Girsberger, supra note 121, at 8. For a comment on the Italian implementation, see Mario Fabiani, L’attuazione della Direttiva CE sul Diritto di Autore nella Società dell’Informazione. Un Analisi Comparativa, 74 Dir. Aut., 331 (2003).

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  60. According to the official press release, thee Commission has decided, under Article 228 of the EC Treaty, to send France and Finland further “reasoned opinions” requesting them to comply immediately with the previous judgments of the European Court of Justice on their non-implementation of the Directive. In addition, the Commission has sent the Czech Republic a letter of formal notice — the first stage of infringement proceedings under Article 226 of the EC Treaty — asking it to provide full information on its implementation of Directive. Finally, it has also sent an informal letter to Spain to receive information about compliance with a previous judgment of the European Court on its nonimplementation of the Directive. See Press Release, Copyright: infringement proceedings against France, Finland, Spain and the Czech Republic for nonimplementation of 2001 Copyright Directive, available at http://europa.eu.int/r apid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/921&format=HTML&aged=0& language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 1, 2006) (discussing IP/05/92 1 Brussels, Jul. 13, 2005).

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  71. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has documented numerous problems that anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA have caused in the U.S. for legitimate users of copyrighted works. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Five Years under the DMCA, (Sept. 24, 2003), http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended_consequences.php. See Calovi, supra note 104.

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  76. “...to the extent necessary to benefit from that exception or limitation and where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected work or subject-matter concerned.” Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17–18 (EC). The Article also allows for right-holders’ compliance through “agreements between rightholders and other parties concerned,” namely through contracts. For a critical overview of the Directive, see Séverine Dussollier, Fair Use by Design in the European Copyright Directive of 2001, 46 Comm. ACM 51 (2003).

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  81. Moreover, it has to be stressed how the Directive does not specifically identify any kind of measure to be taken by developers of technological protection measures, nor provides for guidelines in case of non-compliance both in terms of defining the extent of a possible action and the time deemed reasonable for voluntarily accomplishment. See MacQueen, supra Intro., note 33, at 219.

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  82. Orin S. Kerr, A Lukewarm Defense of the DMCA, in Copy Fights, supra Wayne Crews eds., 2002 note 1, at 163, 168. 2001/29 is part of a wider program started with Directive 2000/31 aimed at preserving the status quo of power of the music industry through progressively but steadily limiting users’ rights. The E-Commerce Directive 2001/31 obliges ISPs to remove illegal material or promptly inform authorities about such activities. This responsibility is only relieved when the ISP is not aware at all of the illegality of activities. Thus, ISPs are forced to intervene when illegality is proved, and also when it is only presumed. See Enzo Mazza, Più facile contrastare il fenomeno della pirateria musicale online, Interlex, May 15, 2003, http://www.interlex.it/c pyright/mazza3.htm.

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  137. According to Robin Gross, the director of civil liberties group IP Justice, the Directive “ [C]reates a broad new ‘Right of Information’ which requires Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to disclose personal information about their customers to recording industry executives for civil prosecution of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file-sharing and other activities. Similar subpoena powers, created under the notorious US Digital Millennium Copyright Act” even if the power assigned by the directive could be much wider because it “applies to all types of intellectual property infringements, not just copyrights.” Robin Gross, EU Passes Dangerous IP Law, Despite MEP’s Conflict of Interest “Midnight Knocks” by Recording Industry Executives Get Go-Ahead (2004), http://www.ipjustice.org/CODE/release20040309_en.shtml [hereinafter IPjustice].

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  143. The agreement states that governments have to ensure that intellectual property rights can be enforced under their laws, and that the penalties for infringement are tough enough to deter further violations. The measures must be fair and equitable, and not extremely complicated or costly. TRIPS art. 41.2. They should not require irrational time-limits or unwarranted delays. TRIPS art. 41.2. People involved should be able to ask a court to review an administrative decision or to appeal a lower court’s ruling. TRIPS art. 42. The agreement illustrates in some detail how enforcement should be handled, including rules for obtaining evidence, TRIPS art. 43, provisional measures, TRIPS art. 50, injunctions, TRIPS art. 44, damages, TRIPS art. 45, and other penalties, TRIPS art. 46. It also statues that courts should have the right, under certain conditions, to order the disposal or destruction of pirated or counterfeit goods. TRIPS art. 59. Wilful and malicious trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale should be criminal offences. TRIPS art. 61. For other details, see Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, World Trade Organization, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/a grm7_e.htm (last visited June 3, 2006).

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  146. Is important to underline that, “[c]ounterfeiting and piracy are generally accompanied by deliberate cheating of the consumer as to the quality he is entitled to expect from a product bearing, for instance, a famous brand name, since counterfeit or pirated products are produced without the checks made by the competent authorities and do not comply with minimum quality standards. When he buys counterfeit or pirated products, the consumer does not in principle benefit from a guarantee, aftersales service or effective remedy in the event of damage.” See European Union SCADPlus Service, supra note 183.

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  155. For example, in Italy, the so-called Decree “Urbani” — “Interventions to oppose the illegal electronic circulation of audiovisual material, and to support film and entertainment activities” (Decreto 72/04), gave rise to a fervent controversy because, in its very first version, it distorted the distinction between violating copyrights for commercial and for non-commercial purposes, overturning the previous legal system. The Decree was converted into law, as amended by Law No. 128 of May 21, 2004 published in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic No. 119 of May 22, 2004, and it went into effect on May 23, 2004. One of the goals of the provision is to fight electronic piracy. In this sense it was greatly opposed by the Internet Service Provider associations and telecommunications firms that, while agreeing with its ultimate objectives, felt that the system of safeguards the decree introduces for digital media copyrights is particularly repressive and disproportionate. Recently the law has been amended again by the law No. 43 of 31 March, 2005 published in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic No. 75 of April 1, 2005. For some criticism of this law, see Calovi & Lucchi, supra Pirateria Musicale: Tecnologia e Diritto, 7/8 Stud. Iuris 1027, (2004) note 101. See also Italian Minister of Innovation and Technologies: Department for Innovation and Technology, Report of the Interministerial Committee on Digital Content in the Internet Age, 33 (2005), http://www.mininnovazione.it/eng/intervento/allegati/rap_cont_dig.pdf.

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  165. By sheer coincidence, the European Parliament’s Rapporteur of the new intellectual property enforcement directive is Janelly Fourtou, wife of Jean-René Fourtou former top manager of Aventis and currently the CEO of Vivendi Universal, the media giant that is the biggest holder of intellectual property rights worldwide. See File Swappers Avoid Home Invasion, BBC News (UK ed.), Mar. 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3545839.stm.

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(2006). Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: Regulation through Law. In: Digital Media & Intellectual Property. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg . https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36543-5_3

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