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Investigations of Granularity and Payoffs in 2×2 Games under Replicator Dynamics

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Formal Modelling in Electronic Commerce

Abstract

This paper describes an investigation of several 2×2 games in iterated form. Players play the games repeatedly and are limited to mixed strategies, with particular actions chosen probabilistically. The games investigated include Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt in various forms. The reward structure and the granularity of the games—number of games played per generation in the replicator dynamics—are the main factors investigated, with surprising results.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chajadine, S., Mack, D., Slan, A.J. (2005). Investigations of Granularity and Payoffs in 2×2 Games under Replicator Dynamics. In: Kimbrough, S.O., Wu, D. (eds) Formal Modelling in Electronic Commerce. International Handbooks on Information Systems. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26989-4_21

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