Abstract
The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.
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Kalai, E. (2005). Partially-Specified Large Games. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0
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