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Notes
Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, A Historical Introduction, 2 Vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), Vol. II, p. 399.
Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, Martin Heidegger (ed.), James S. Churchill (trans.) (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 49.
Ibid., p. 130.
Ibid., p. 52.
Mario Sancipriano, “R. Ingarden et le ‘vrai’ Bergsonisme”, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. IV (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976), p. 141.
Gilles Deleuze has noted Husserl and Bergson’s indebtedness to Riemann in Bergsonism, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (trans.) (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 117; pp. 39–40.
Bernhard Riemann, Gesammelte mathematische Werke und wissenschaftlicher Nachlass (Leipzig: Teubner, 1876), p. 254; W. K. Clifford (trans.), Nature 8, number 183: 14; quoted from Robin Dune, “Splitting Time, Bergson’s Philosophical Legacy”, Philosophy Today, Summer 2000, p. 154.
Concerning the province of objects within a manifold, Husserl writes, in Formal and Transcendental Logic, Dorion Cairns (trans.) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 91, that it “is a province... that is determined solely by the circumstance that... among the Objects belonging to the province, certain connections are possible, which come under certain fundamental laws having such and such a determinate form (here the only determining condition). In respect of their matter, the Objects remain completely indeterminate.... Thus they are determined... exclusively by the form of the connections ascribed to them. These connections themselves are accordingly as little determined in respect of content as the Objects connected”.
Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, F. L. Pogson (trans.) (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2001), p. 99.
Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., p. 101.
Ibid., p. 100.
Ibid., p. 227.
Ibid., p. 101.
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 23.
Ibid., p. 24.
Edmund Husserl, Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, Collected Works, Vol. VII, Richard Rojcewicz (ed. and trans.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 51.
Ibid., p. 59. Concerning the perception of a surface covered with sensible data — the’ spatial extension of an appearance’ — Husserl says that this is a “qualitative continuity.... That essentially implies fragmentability and the ideal possibility of an abstraction into phases”.
Idem.
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction To Phenomenology, Dorion Cairns (trans.) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 45.
Idem.
Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (trans.) (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 81. Cf. Time and Free Will, p. 84.
Matter andMemory, p. 134.
Thing and Space, p. 55, emphasis mine.
Ibid., p. 64.
Idem.
Ibid., p. 257.
Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, W. R. Boyce Gibson (trans.) (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd; New York: Humanities Press Inc, 1931), p. 132. Husserl adds: “The perspected variable, however, is in principle possible only as spatial (it is indeed spatial in its essence), but not possible as experience.” This, of course, excludes the body, for the body is given in perspectives no less than any other object of outer perception.
Ibid., p. 133.
Ibid., p. 134. And Husserl adds: “Where there is no Being in space, it is senseless to speak of seeing from different standpoints with a changing orientation, and under the different aspects thereby opened up, or through varying appearances and perspective shadings.”
Cartesian Meditations, p. 45.
Edmund Husserl, De la synthèse passive: Logique transcendantale et constitutions originaires, Bruce Bégout and Jean Kessler (trans.) (Jérôme Millon, 1998), p. 95; all translations into English are mine.
Ideas I, p. 397. Or as Husserl says in Cartesian Meditations, p. 49: “in the flux of intentional synthesis... an essentially necessary conformity to type prevails”.
Ideas I, p. 153.
Cartesian Meditations, p. 43.
Cf. Ideas I, §§ 38, 46, 82, 83.
This genetic difference is also true of “all acts directed towards essences, or towards the intentional experiences of other Egos with other experience-streams” (Ideas I, p. 124).
Idem.
2Ibid., p. 236.
Ibid., p. 139. Husserl adds that while experiences exclude spatial orientations, an experience has temporal orientations, notably past, present and future, in which case, then, our reflection on some experience does imply some ‘imperfection’, for the past and future phases of an experience are ‘not there’. But “this incompleteness... which belongs to the essence of our perception of experience is fundamentally other than that which is of the essence of ‘transcendent’ perception, perception through a presentation that varies perspectively through such a thing as appearance” (Ibid., p. 140).
Ibid., p. 236.
CartesianMeditations, p. 43.
Henri Bergson, “Introduction (Part II)”, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, Mabelle L. Andison (trans.) (New York: Citadel Press, 1946), p. 32.
Ideas I, p. 143.
Ibid., p. 145.
Ibid., p. 152; cf. Ibid., p. 153. Whether the world’s dependence on consciousness is to be understood epistemologically, strictly in terms of essential relations, or also ontologically, as involving existential relations, does not concem us here, where what is at stake is to establish a contrast with Bergson. For the view of ontological dependence, cf. Herman Philipse, “Transcendental Idealism”, in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, Barry Smith and David W. Smith (eds.) (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 239–305. For the view of epistemological dependence, cf. Richard H. Holmes, “Is Transcendental Phenomenology Committed to Idealism?”, The Monist 59 (1975).
Cf. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 44.
On these points I refer the reader to John Brough’s essay, “The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl’s Early Writings on Time-Consciousness”, Man and World 5(3) (August 1972): 298–326.
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 48.
Ibid., p. 132. These are contraries: what is indivisible, it is conunonly assumed, cannot change, cannot be subject to modification; if, e.g., one were to change Socrates’ individuality by inserting another soul into him, then it would no longer be this Socrates. Conversely, that which is changeable, it is generally held, is divisible. It is Bergson and Husserl’s virtue to have combined contrary properties, indivisibility and changeability, into one concept of time.
Time and Free Will, pp. 113, 104.
Cf. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 64.
Ibid., p. 50. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 3 Vols., Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (trans.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), Vol. III, p. 30.
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 49.
Ibid., p. 50.
Ibid., p. 51.
Cf., Ibid., p. 130.
Ibid., p. 51.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 53.
Matter and Memory, p. 34.
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 62.
Idem.
Matter and Memory, p. 67.
De la synthèse passive, p. 76.
Ibid., p. 77.
Cf. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, pp. 64–68.
There is, of course, nothing surprising in this if, to begin with, the “question of the ‘origin of time’ ” is addressed from “the point of view of theory of knowledge” (Ibid., p. 27).
Ibid., p. 65.
Ibid., p. 73.
Ibid., pp. 162–163.
Noted by André Robinet in Bergson et les métamorphoses de la durée (Paris: Éditions Seghers, 1965), p. 66.
Cf. Matter and Memory, pp. 35–37.
Ibid., p. 17. By calling objects, or the elements of matter, ‘images’, Bergson has in mind the ‘object’ of common sense, notably, something placed halfway between what the realist calls a ‘thing’ and what the idealist calls a ‘representation’: it is an image since the object is as we perceive, with all the appurtenant sensible qualities, but it is a self-existing image, for perception does not bring the object into being (Ibid., pp. 9–10).
Ibid, pp. 17–18.
Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., p. 25.
Perception arises “from a sort of question addressed to motor activity” (Ibid., p. 46). Perception is sensory-motor owing to the double faculty of the body: sensing affections within, and performing automatic or voluntary actions (Ibid., p. 61).
M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Colin Smith (trans.) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962), p. 78.
Matter and Memory, p. 32.
Ibid., p. 31.
Ibid., p. 61.
Ibid., p. 66.
Ibid., p. 38.
Ibid., pp. 35–36.
Ibid., pp. 78–84.
Ibid., p. 80.
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 76.
Matter and Memory, p. 82. Insofar as this is true of every member of the body, the latter is a collection of inductive motor mechanisms: “we may speak of the body as an ever advancing boundary between the future and the past, as a pointed end, which our past is continually driving forward into our future” (Ibid., p. 78).
Ibid., p. 81.
Henri Bergson, “Memory of the Present and False Recognition”, in Time & The Instant: Essays in the Physics and Philosophy of Time, Robin Durie (ed.) (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), p. 47.
Matter and Memory, p. 102. “Memory... creates anew the present perception” (ibid., p. 101).
Ibid., p. 207.
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 131.
Matter and Memory, p. 83.
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Winkler, R. (2006). Husserl and Bergson on Time and Consciousness. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book Three. Analecta Husserliana, vol 90. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3718-X_6
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