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References
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Sobel, J.H. (2005). Backward Induction Without Tears?. In: Vanderveken, D. (eds) Logic, Thought and Action. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3167-X_19
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