Abstract
There’s presented a proposal of a new certificate revocation scheme using linked authenticated dictionaries in the note. It was mainly basis of idea of Certificate Revocation Trees linking, but it’s more generall. This scheme prevents Certification Authority doing some possible frauds. This way the neccessery trust level to CA is decreased.
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© 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
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Maćków, W. (2005). Linked authenticated dictionaries for certificate status verification. In: Pejaś, J., Piegat, A. (eds) Enhanced Methods in Computer Security, Biometric and Artificial Intelligence Systems. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-23484-5_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-23484-5_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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