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Abstract

In the context of competitive wholesale electricity markets, the unit commitment problem has shifted from a firm level optimization problem to a market level problem. Some centralized market designs use it to ensure reliability and determine day-ahead market prices. This chapter reviews the recent history of short-term electricity markets in the United States to evaluate the experience with alternative market designs and the implications for unit commitment modeling. It presents principles for the design of the next generation of unit commitment-based markets.

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© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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O’Neill, R.P., Helman, U., Sotkiewicz, P.M., Rothkopf, M.H., Stewart, W.R. (2002). Regulatory Evolution, Market Design and Unit Commitment. In: Hobbs, B.F., Rothkopf, M.H., O’Neill, R.P., Chao, Hp. (eds) The Next Generation of Electric Power Unit Commitment Models. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 36. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47663-0_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47663-0_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-7334-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-306-47663-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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