Abstract
We study here the problem of modifying the (Shapley) value of a characteristic function game so as to take into account the possibility that some players — because of personal or political affinities — may be more likely to act together than others. We shall use y[v] to denote the usual value of the game v.
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© 1977 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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Owen, G. (1977). Values of Games with a Priori Unions. In: Henn, R., Moeschlin, O. (eds) Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 141. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45494-3_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45494-3_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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