Abstract
In this paper, we propose a truthful multi-unit double auction scheme for the scenarios that multiple buyers/sellers have different demands to buy/sell, which involves a series of bid-related buyer group construction and winner determination strategies. In the analysis, we show the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed scheme and prove that it improves the spectrum reusability and is truthful. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first multi-unit double auction approach for wireless spectrum allocation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
McHenry, M.A., Tenhula, P.A., McCloskey, D., Roberson, D.A., Hood, C.S.: Chicago spectrum occupancy measurements & analysis and a long-term studies proposal. In: Proc. TPAS (2006)
Jia, J.C., Zhang, Q., Zhang, Q., et al.: Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access. In: Proc. of the 10th ACM Mobihoc, New Orleans, Louisiana, United States, pp. 3–12 (2009)
Zhu, J., Liu, K.J.R.: Multi-stage pricing game for collusion resistant dynamic spectrum allocation. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 26(1), 182–191 (2008)
Kasbekar, G.S., Sarkar, S.: Spectrum auction framework for access allocation in cognitive radio networks. In: Proc. ACM Mobihoc (2009)
Zhou, X., Gandhi, S., Suri, S., Zheng, H.: eBay in the Sky: Strategy-Proof Wireless Spectrum Auctions. In: The Proceedings of ACM MobiCom 2008, San Francisco, CA (September 2008)
McAfee, R.P., McMillan, J.: Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 699–738 (1987)
Milgrom, P.R., Weber, R.J.: A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 1089–1122 (1982)
Friedman, D.: The double auction market institution: A survey. The double auction market: Institution, Theories, and Evidence, 3–25 (1993)
Zhou, X., Zheng, H.: TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double spectrum Auction. In: Proc. of IEEE Infocom 2009, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, pp. 999–1007 (2009)
Dhananjay, A., Zhang, H., Li, J.Y., Subramanian, L.: Practical, Distributed Channel Assignment and Routing in Dual-radio Mesh Networks. In: Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM 2009, Barcelona, Spain, pp. 99–110 (2009)
Alicherry, M., Bhatia, R., Li, L.: Joint channel assignment and routing for throughput optimization in multi-radio wireless mesh networks. In: Proc. of ACM MobiCom 2005, Cologne, Germany, pp. 58–72 (2005)
Babaioff, M., Nisan, N.: Concurrent auctions across the supply chain. In: Proc. of Economic Commerce 2001, Tampa, Florida, United States, pp. 1–10 (2001)
McAfee, R.P.: A dominant strategy double auction. Journal of Economic Theory 56(2), 434–450 (1992)
Huang, P., Scheller-Wolf, A., Sycara, K.: Design of a multi-unit double auction e-market. Comput. Intelligence 18(4), 596–617 (2002)
Wurman, P.R., Walsh, W.E., Wellman, M.P.: Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: theory and implementation. Decision Support System 24(1), 17–27 (1998)
Babaioff, M., Walsh, W.E.: Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation. In: Proc. of Forth ACM Conf. on Electronics Commerce, San Diego, United States, pp. 64–75 (2003)
Chu, L.Y., Shen, Z.M.: Truthful double auction mechanisms. Operation Research 56(1), 102–120 (2008)
Huang, H.: A Novel Strategy-proof Multi-unit Double Auction Framework for Spectrum Allocation. Tech. Report (2011), http://staff.ustc.edu.cn/~kxing/Publications/TechReport/huang11.pdf
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Huang, H., Sun, Ye., Xing, K., Xu, H., Xu, X., Huang, L. (2012). Truthful Multi-unit Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Communications. In: Wang, X., Zheng, R., Jing, T., Xing, K. (eds) Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications. WASA 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7405. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31869-6_21
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31869-6_21
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31868-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31869-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)