F. Concluding remarks
Strict liability is the chosen liability rule in the Bunkers Convention, and insurance is also required. In practice, even where there is no legal duty to insure against liability, the liable person tends to voluntarily procure the insurance policy against such a large-scale liability.
In earlier conventions, the person who can most easily be identified was chosen as the liable person and also the person to take out insurance. The answer to the questions of who shall be liable and who is in a better position to insure against liability under the Bunkers Convention is, however, novel to other civil liability conventions: the shipowner that includes a group of different persons is strictly liable for pollution damage; however, only the registered owner is required to take out insurance.
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References
For instance, Abecassis, David W. (ed.), Oil Pollution from Ships (1985), pp. 357–389; Gauci, Gotthard, Oil Pollution at sea: Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage (1997), pp. 10–16.
Rogers, W.V.H., Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (1998), p. 472.
See ibid., p. 473, any footnotes omitted.
Wu, Chao, Pollution from the Carriage of Oil by Sea: Liability and Compensation (1996), p. 14.
Abecassis, David W. (ed.), supra, note 5, p. 359: “...there rarely will be sufficient certainty that the spillage or discharge of the oil on the sea will lead to the shore being contaminated-even in these days the wind and tide are not wholly predictable.”
Wu, Chao, supra, note 8, p. 15, Abecassis, David W.(ed.), supra, note 5, pp. 358–363. Also see: Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Co.Ltd [1956] A.C.218, H.L.; [1954] 2 Q.B.182, C.A.; [1953] 3 W.L.R.773, Q.B., Fowler v. Lanning [1959] 2 W.L.R. 249, Q.B., Letang v. Couper [1964] 2 All E.R.929.
Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd Appellants; v. Southport Corporation Respondents. [1956] A.C. 218 (H.L.), at 225.
Page Keeton, W. (gen.ed.), Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed., p. 616, 617.
Attorney General v. PYA Quarries Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B. 169, at.170.
A detailed analysis is provided by Abecassis, David W. (ed.), supra, note 5, pp. 364–368.
Rogers, W.V.H., supra, note 6, p. 494.
Abecassis, David W. (ed.), supra, note 5, p. 369.
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Gauci, Gotthard, supra, note 5, p. 11.
Wu, Chao, supra, note 8, p. 17.
Rogers, W.V.H., supra, note 6, p. 90: “Thus its (negligence) ingredients are: (1) a legal duty on the part of A towards B to exercise care in such conduct of A as falls within the scope of the duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) consequential damage to B...”
[1954] 2 Q.B.182.
Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Co.Ltd [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 655.
Abecassis, David W. (ed.), supra, note 5, p. 383.
[1956]A.C.218, H.L.
Keeton, G.W., ‘The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon: English Law Aspects’, Current Legal Problems 1968, Volume 21, pp. 94–112, at 98.
See IMCO: official records of the international legal conference on marine pollution damage, 1969, hereafter it will be called “O.R. 1969”, at 627.
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Bergkamp, Lucas, Liability and Environment: Private and Public Law Aspects of Civil Liability for Environmental Harm in an International Context (2001), p. 264.
See IMCO, O.R. 1969, supra, note 27, p. 460.
This was asserted by Professor Herber of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany. See O.R. 1969, supra, note 27, at 627.
See IMCO, O.R. 1969, supra, note 27, at 459.
See ibid., at 458–459.
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[1868] Lloyds’ Rep. 3 H.L. 330. Also see Vandall, Frank J., Strict Liability: Legal and Economic Analysis (1989), pp. 1–12.
Wilde, Mark, Civil Liability for Environmental Damage (2002), p. 43, 44.
See “England” part by Rogers, W. V. Horton, in: Koch, B.A./Koziol, H. (eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability (2002), p. 108.
See ibid.
Koch, B.A./ Koziol, H. (eds.), ibid., pp. 395–396: “As a first observation, it is necessary to point out that strict liability in most jurisdictions predominantly seems to be based on singular rules rather than general or at least broader clauses. This is particularly noteworthy for civil law countries. While Austrian courts, for example, (cautiously) apply existing strict liability laws analogously (which reduces problems of tardy), German and Swiss practice so far deny the possibility of extending such statutory rules at all. French law, on the other hand, not only has a clause which (at least in today’s understanding) introduces general liability for ‘deeds of the things within one’s keeping’ (the famous Art.1384 subs. 1 Code Civil), courts furthermore seem to be quite open for an extensive application of other rules (such as the loi Badinter).” Citations omitted.
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Gauci, Gotthard, supra, note 5, p. 19.
Gauci, Gotthard, supra, note 5, p. 20.
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For more details, see Bergkamp, Lucas, ibid., pp. 86–96. For more discussion regarding the issue that strict liability is preferred, see Section B.II in this chapter.
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Baughen, Simon, Shipping Law (2004), p. 8.
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See ibid., at 640.
See ibid., at 641.
See ibid., at 443.
See ibid., at 690.
See ibid., at 444.
See ibid., at 690.
Wu, Chao, supra, note 8, p. 54.
Wu, Chao, supra, note 8, p. 95.
Ibid.
Morrison, Fred L./ Wolfrum, Rüdiger (eds.), supra, note 55, p. 832: “Once a system has established a standard of liability and an actor within that system fails to meet that standard, exceptions to liability may still be possible...”
These categories are based on the questionnaires in: Koch, B.A./Koziol, H. (eds.), supra, note 38.
Rogers, W. V. Horton, ‘England’, in: ibid., pp. 101–126, at 118.
Galand-Carval, Suzanne, ‘France’, in: ibid., pp. 127–145, at 137.
Fedtke, Joerg/ Magnus, Ulrich, ‘Germany’, in: ibid., pp. 147–176, at 163.
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Perron, Edgar du/ Boom, Willem H. van, ‘Netherlands’ section, in: ibid., pp. 227–255, at 147.
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Ibid., pp. 25–26: “If another could have succeeded in averting the occurrence, then the occurrence is not inevitable and there is no defence.”
Abecassis, David W. (ed.), supra, note 5, p. 205.
Joel v. Morison (1934) 6 C&P 501.
More detailed analysis see Gauci, Gotthard, supra, note 5, pp. 75–76.
Abecassis, David W. (ed.), supra, note 5, p. 206, the author quoted IMO documents: LEG/CONF/C.2/WP.41,OR 601, LEG/CONF/C.2/SR.18,OR 738.
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Wu, Chao, supra, note 8, p. 61.
For more details read Bennett, Howard, supra, note 92, in: Chapter 6, pp. 115–135.
Templeman, Frederick, Templeman on Marine Insurance: its Principles and Practice (1986), 6th ed., pp. 190–210; see also Ivamy, E R Hardy: General Principles of Insurance Law (1993), 6th ed., pp. 406–420.
[1918] A.C.350.
Ibid., at 369.
Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Minister of War Transport (The ‘Coxwold’) H.L. (1942) 73 Ll.L.Rep. 1.
Ibid., at 10.
Bennett, Howard, supra, note 92, p. 447.
Gauci, Gotthard, supra, note 5, p. 75.
Wu, Chao, ‘Liability and Compensation for Bunker Pollution’, 33 J. Mar. L. & Com. 553 (2002), pp. 553–567, at 560.
This definition is from William Tetley, Glossary of Maritime Law Terms (2004), available at: <http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/glossaries/maritime/#letter_j> (visited 1 June 2005).
Hazelwood, Steven J., P& I Clubs: Law and Practice (2000), p. 83.
Ibid., p. 99.
Ibid., p. 385. According to Club practice, if the owner’s insurance and charterer’s insurance are covered with the same Club for one and the same vessel and both members become liable, the Club’s own retention will be twice U.S. $5 million, which was the basic retention for the member at the time.
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(2007). Strict Liability and Insurance. In: Compulsory Insurance and Compensation for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage. Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, vol 5. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45903-3_4
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