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Network Elicitation in Adversarial Environment

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Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9996))

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Abstract

We study a problem of a defender who wants to protect a network against contagious attack by an intelligent adversary. The defender could only protect a fixed number of nodes and does not know the network. Each of the nodes in the network does not know the network either, but knows his/her neighbours only. We propose an incentive compatible mechanism allowing the defender to elicit information about the whole network. The mechanism is efficient in the sense that under truthful reports it assigns the protection optimally.

Marcin Dziubiński was supported by the Strategic Resilience of Networks project realized within the Homing Plus programme of the Foundation for Polish Science, co-financed by the European Union from the Regional Development Fund within Operational Programme Innovative Economy (“Grants for Innovation”). Piotr Sankowski was supported by ERC project PAAl-POC 680912, EU FET project MULTIPLEX 317532 and polish funds for years 2012-2016 for co-financed international projects.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The assumption of perfect defence is not a crucial one and is made for presentation simplicity. The mechanisms proposed in the paper would work even if protection could fail with some probability. Crucial is the fact that every node prefers to be protected to not being protected.

  2. 2.

    Another common approach is to consider average case scenario, which is common in the study of network reliability (c.f. [3], for example).

  3. 3.

    This paper is concerned with vertex cuts. Therefore we will use a term ‘cut’ to refer to vertex cuts (as opposed to edge cuts, which are not in scope of this paper).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw, Banacha 2, 02-097, Warsaw, Poland

    Marcin Dziubiński, Piotr Sankowski & Qiang Zhang

Authors
  1. Marcin Dziubiński
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  2. Piotr Sankowski
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  3. Qiang Zhang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marcin Dziubiński .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. New York University , New York, New York, USA

    Quanyan Zhu

  2. The University of Melbourne , Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

    Tansu Alpcan

  3. University of Brighton , Brighton, United Kingdom

    Emmanouil Panaousis

  4. University of Southern California , Los Angeles, California, USA

    Milind Tambe

  5. Carnegie Mellon University , Pittsburgh, New York, USA

    William Casey

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Dziubiński, M., Sankowski, P., Zhang, Q. (2016). Network Elicitation in Adversarial Environment. In: Zhu, Q., Alpcan, T., Panaousis, E., Tambe, M., Casey, W. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9996. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_23

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-47412-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-47413-7

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