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Impact of Propagation Information in the Model of Tax Audit

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Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

An effective tax system is an important part of economic and social interactions in human society. The key element of the tax system is tax control which provides the main functions of taxation and allows for increasing tax revenue and fees to the state budget. However, total tax audits of a population of taxpayers is economically unreasonable, and even selective tax audits are not always profitable. In this case the propagation of information can be viewed as an “infection of the mind,” and its spread shows an interesting resemblance to that of epidemics. We thus use a modification of the classical Susceptible-Infected-Recovery model to describe the process. We assume that information propagates through the population by pairwise contacts between spreaders and others in the population and Informed agents disseminate information through their network of contacts or social networks. We study a model of spreading information in a large population of taxpayers and describe the dynamics of this process in complex social networks. We formulate an optimal control problem of tax auditing and analyze the behavior of agents in different subgroups depending on received information.

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Correspondence to Elena Gubar .

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Gubar, E., Kumacheva, S., Zhitkova, E., Porokhnyavaya, O. (2016). Impact of Propagation Information in the Model of Tax Audit. In: Petrosyan, L., Mazalov, V. (eds) Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_5

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