Abstract
As officials seek to identify the events and circumstances that generated the 2007–2009 financial crisis, they are attracted to explanations that deflect blame from themselves and the organizations they serve. The resulting array of seemingly authoritative explanations creates forward-looking policy turbulence. Conflicts between alternative crisis stories make it hard for outsiders to understand whether and how various proposed reforms might or might not reduce the frequency or depth of future crises. A particularly important issue concerns how giant U.S. financial institutions and automobile companies made themselves too difficult to fail and unwind (TDFU).
This chapter was also published in the Review of Social Economy, Vol. 68, 2010 and appeared as Networks Financial Institute Policy Brief 2009-PB-08C.
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Appendix: Tables on Financial Sector Lobbying Compiled by consumerwatchdog.org
Appendix: Tables on Financial Sector Lobbying Compiled by consumerwatchdog.org
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Kane, E.J. (2011). The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Consequences of Regulation-Induced Innovation. In: Tatom, J. (eds) Financial Market Regulation. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6637-7_7
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