Abstract
At the Ninth World Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies in 2007, molecular biologist Jesper Hoffmeyer recalls the impetus leading to the founding of “biosemiotics” as a research agenda in Denmark by himself and Claus Emmeche in 1985 thusly:
Claus Emmeche(1956–),João Queiroz(1963–),and Charbel El-Hani(1968–)
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Notes
- 1.
Readers wishing to learn more about Peirce’s philosophy and logic of semiotic should consult Murphey 1993, Nöth 1995, Parker 1998, and Peirce 1931–1935, 1967, 1976, 1998, and 1982–2000, as detailed in our Reference List.
- 2.
When a part or subsystem of a system is the interpreter, its actions as an interpreter will be typically subordinated, i.e., regulated by the system as a whole (that we will call, in this case, a “global” interpreter). We can call, as Jablonka (2002), the subordinated interpreters “interpretative systems” within a global interpreter. It can happen that a system loses its control over one or more of its included interpreters. In this case, dysfunctional states may result from the interpretation of signs in that system. These are misinterpretation events. By “misinterpretation”, we mean the interpretation of a sign that does not lead to a successful coping with its circumstances, i.e., that does not contribute to the maintenanceof the dynamic stability of a system in a given context.
- 3.
- 4.
In the context of our analysis, we will not employ the concept of Final Interpretant. It will not play an important role in our current arguments, and, thus, we think we can leave it to subsequent works.
- 5.
It should be clear at this point that by “communication” we mean more than mere transmission of a form.
- 6.
The irreducibility of the triadic relation S-O-I is a logical property. Therefore, while it makes no sense to sort out a primary constraining factor in such a logical relation, dynamically it makes sense to sort out the dynamical object as the primary constraining factor of semiosis (for a detailed discussion about this issue, see Short 1998: 31).
- 7.
For more details, we refer the reader to El-Hani et al. (forthcoming).
- 8.
We will deliberately avoid introducing a large number of details, which can be easily found in any molecular and cell biology textbook (e.g., Lodish et al. 2003, Cooper and Haussman 2003, Alberts et al. 2002, Lewin 2000). These books are also the basic sources in this section, unless otherwise noticed. As the following paragraphs only summarize some elementary ideas in cell and molecular biology, any reader who doesn’t feel any need of perusing these notions can simply skip them.
- 9.
If alternative splicing does not occur, it will be the case that signs in DNA and signs in mature mRNA will be equivalent.
- 10.
In the case of genes, the objects at stake are entities, as described above. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that, in Peirce’s framework, it is not the case that the object of a sign should necessarily be an entity, a thing, or even an existent. Consider, for instance, the following passage: “The Objects – for a Sign may have any number of them – may each be a single known existing thing or thing believed formerly to have existed or expected to exist, or a collection of such things, or a known quality or relation or fact, which single Object may be a collection, or whole of parts, or it may have some other mode of being, such as some act permitted whose being does not prevent its negation from being equally permitted, or something of a general nature desired, required, or invariably found under certain general circumstances” (CP 2.232).
- 11.
To be more precise, we should consider that some proteins acquire their mature conformation spontaneously. These proteins show the property of self-assembly. In this case, the three-dimensional structure of a protein simply follows from its primary sequence of amino acids, and, therefore, the immediate Object directly determines the dynamical Object. (Here we find yet another peculiar feature of the genetic information system, when compared to the standard Peircean framework). There are a number of proteins, however, that cannot self-assemble and should be assisted by proteins called “chaperones” in order to acquire their proper structures. In this case, the sequence of amino acids, the Immediate object, only indicates the functional protein, the dynamic object. In the text, we are dealing particularly with this case, which fits Peirce’s understanding of the relationship between immediate and dynamical objects. “Chaperones” can be treated, in these terms, as part of the habits cells acquired in evolution.
- 12.
- 13.
In a Peircean framework, the immediate object can be understood as the characteristics selected in the sign as a means of indicating the dynamical object. It is not the case, in this framework, that the immediate object is a condition of possibility to the dynamical object. Nevertheless, in the case we are analyzing here the interpreter creates a dynamical object of a given class (showing a given habit) on the grounds of indications present in the sign. A cell uses signs in DNA as a basis for synthesizing a dynamical object sufficiently resembling a past dynamical object which does not exist anymore but resulted in successful, adaptive experiences. This is the reason why we claim that, in this case, the immediate object establishes conditions of possibility to the dynamical object.
- 14.
By “coding”, we mean here a system of constraints which establishes a range of possible effects of a sign (see Nöth 1995: 210).
- 15.
In this picture, it is important to take in due account that we are not claiming that DNA causes or brings about the protein as an object, since DNA is a set of data (or, as we prefer, signs) rather than a program, a source of materials rather than a master agent in the cell. It is the DNA processing system that produces the proteins. We are not claiming, therefore, that the sign causes the object.
- 16.
In another paper, we substantiate and elaborate these conclusions by means of a more detailed analysis of some processes in the genetic information system, namely, transcription and translation. For this analysis, see El-Hani et al. (forthcoming).
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Favareau, D. (2009). Information and Semiosis in Living Systems: A Semiotic Approach. In: Essential Readings in Biosemiotics. Biosemiotics, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9650-1_20
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