Abstract
Social objects exist, the proof being the difference between thinking to promise something, and actually promising something: once you give your word, the promise keeps on existing, even in case you forget about it, or—as more frequently happens—you change your mind. The first aim of this article is to expand on the nature of social objects, as contrasted with physical and ideal objects, and to spell out the steps that lead to their discovery. Secondly, I will illustrate and criticize the major contemporary theory on social objects, John Searle’s theory, and compare it with another theory, according to which social objects are a kind of inscription. Lastly, I want show how, from this standpoint, a social ontology evolves naturally into a theory of documents, which I propose to name “documentality”.
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Notes
- 1.
I would like to thank Giuliano Torrengo for important comments on the theses contained in this article.
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If one maintains that it is false that a social object depends from a particular physical substrate, but it is true that every social object generically depends on some physical substrate (namely an inscription of some sort), one can keep on criticizing Searle’s position (that concerns rather the fact that Searle points to the “wrong” physical substrate, somehow), and at the same time avoid Smith’s “representational” conclusions. The chess match does not depend on a particular chessboard, neither depends it on two particular computers, or some particulars neurons. Still, if a match is there, then some physical substrate is also there, and therefore the match generically depends on some physical substrate. On the distinction between particular and generic dependence see (Simon 1987: 296–307).
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According to Smith (2006), thus, it is possible to develop a theory of what he calls “document acts”, i.e. a theory “1. of the different types of document, ranging from free-text memos to standardized forms and templates, and from single documents as self-contained collections of information to bodies of documents incorporating various sorts of riders, codicils, protocols, addenda, amendments, endorsements and other attachments, including maps, photographs, diagrams, signatures and other marks, 2. of the different types of physical medium or bearer for a document’s content (most important here is the distinction between paper and electronic documents), 3. of the different sorts of things we can do to documents (fill in, sign, countersign, stamp, copy, notarize, transfer, invalidate, destroy), 4. of the different sorts of things we can do (achieve, effect) with documents (establish collateral, create organizations, record the deliberations of a committee, initiate legal or military actions), and of the different ways in which, in performing such acts, we may succeed or fail to achieve the corresponding ends, 5. of the institutional systems to which documents belong (marriage, property, law, commerce, trade, credentialing, identification, movement of goods and people), and of the different positional roles within such systems which are occupied by those involved in the performance of the corresponding acts, 6. of the provenance of documents (of what distinguishes an original, authentic document from a mere copy or forgery).”
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See the characterization of the digital signature to be found in the Italian Legislation (Art. 24, March 5th 2005, n. 82, Digital Administration Code). The digital signature ought to univocally refer to one and only subject and to the document or set thereof to which it is affixed or associated. The affixing of a digital signature integrates and substitutes the affixing of seals, stamps, and marks of whatever kind, and used to every aim to which the current normative applies. For the generation of the digital signature, a qualified certificate has to be used, whose validity, at the time of the subscription, is not expired, revoked, or suspended. The validity of the certificate, along with the identifying elements of the titular, of the certificating officeholder, and possibly the constraints on its use has to be established through the qualified certificate itself, according to the technical rules established by article 71.
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Ferraris, M. (2011). Social Ontology and Documentality. In: Sartor, G., Casanovas, P., Biasiotti, M., Fernández-Barrera, M. (eds) Approaches to Legal Ontologies. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0120-5_5
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