Abstract
This paper presents a Common Criteria protection profile for high assurance security kernels (HASK-PP) based on the results and experiences of several (international) projects on design and implementation of trustworthy platforms. Our HASK-PP was motivated by the fact that currently no protection profile is available that appropriately covers trusted computing features such as trusted boot, sealing, and trusted channels (secure channels with inherent attestation).
In particular, we show how trusted computing features are modeled in the HASK protection profile without depending on any concrete implementation for these features. Instead, this is left to the definition of the security targets of a an IT product which claims conformance to the HASK-PP. Our HASK protection profile was evaluated and certified at evaluation assurance level five (EAL5) by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI).
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Löhr, H., Sadeghi, AR., Stüble, C., Weber, M., Winandy, M. (2009). Modeling Trusted Computing Support in a Protection Profile for High Assurance Security Kernels. In: Chen, L., Mitchell, C.J., Martin, A. (eds) Trusted Computing. Trust 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5471. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00587-9_4
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