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Web and Internet Economics

17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings

  • Conference proceedings
  • © 2022

Overview

Editors:
  1. Michal Feldman

    1. Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  2. Hu Fu

    1. Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  3. Inbal Talgam-Cohen

    1. Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS, volume 13112)

Part of the book sub series: Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI (LNISA)

Included in the following conference series:

Conference proceedings info: WINE 2021.

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Table of contents (29 papers)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xiv
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  2. Mechanism Design and Pricing

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1
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    2. Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality

      • Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
      Pages 3-21

    3. Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials

      • Shih-Tang Su, Vijay G. Subramanian, Grant Schoenebeck
      Pages 22-40

    4. The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing

      • Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreas Haupt, Alex Smolin
      Pages 41-58

    5. On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design

      • Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg
      Pages 59-75

    6. Welfare-Preserving \(\varepsilon \)-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss

      • Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka
      Pages 76-94

    7. Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances

      • Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos
      Pages 95-112

    8. Contract Design for Afforestation Programs

      • Wanyi Dai Li, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
      Pages 113-130

    9. Relaxing the Independence Assumption in Sequential Posted Pricing, Prophet Inequality, and Random Bipartite Matching

      • Ioannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu, Zihe Wang
      Pages 131-148

    10. Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness

      • Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
      Pages 149-166

    11. On the Benefits of Being Constrained When Receiving Signals

      • Shih-Tang Su, David Kempe, Vijay G. Subramanian
      Pages 167-185

    12. Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction

      • Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Artem Tsikiridis
      Pages 186-204

  3. Matching, Markets and Equilibria

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 205-205
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    2. Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model

      • Billy Jin, David P. Williamson
      Pages 207-225

    3. Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis

      • Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, Noam Nisan
      Pages 226-243

    4. The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up Your Home?

      • Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner
      Pages 244-261

    5. Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods

      • Sigal Oren, Oren Roth
      Pages 262-279

    6. Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem

      • Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg
      Pages 280-298

    7. Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy

      • Siddhartha Banerjee, David Kempe, Robert Kleinberg
      Pages 299-316
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Other volumes

  1. Web and Internet Economics

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About this book

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

    Michal Feldman

  • Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China

    Hu Fu

  • Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

    Inbal Talgam-Cohen

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