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Interest group coalitions and lobbying environments: toward a new theoretical perspective

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Abstract

In this paper, we provide a preliminary framework meant to fill a theoretical gap in the literature when assessing interest groups relations in collusive settings. Using data from 31 elite interviews with representatives of interest groups active at the European level, we seek first to identify, and then to test the variables that cause groups to coalesce or to work alone on policy initiatives. Upon testing hypotheses based on interest groups’ own perspectives, we find that contrary to both the existing scholarship and popular belief, the strongest predictor of a group’s inclination to coalesce lies in its relative strength vis-à-vis its resources and capacity, while its biggest obstacle to collusion is the relative hold its own membership places on its agenda and decision-making. By establishing the group as the unit of analysis, we are able to illustrate the need for a new stand-alone theoretical framework specific to collusive contexts, as the findings run counter to many theories of interest groups in competitive environments.

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Acknowledgements

This research project was facilitated by the New Faculty Research Grant offered by the University of Houston, Proposal #107832. The author wishes to extend thanks to Brandon Park, Jeronimo Cortina, Bryce Dietrich, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments.

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  1. School of Professional and Extended Studies, American University, Washington, DC, USA

    Laila Sorurbakhsh

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  1. Laila Sorurbakhsh
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Correspondence to Laila Sorurbakhsh.

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Sorurbakhsh, L. Interest group coalitions and lobbying environments: toward a new theoretical perspective. Int Groups Adv 5, 200–223 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-016-0003-8

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