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Sovereign wealth fund investments and the US political process

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The logic of the capitalist system depends on shareholders causing companies to act so as to maximize the value of their shares. It is far from obvious that this will over time be the only motivation of governments as shareholders. They may want to see their national companies compete effectively, or to extract technology or to achieve influence.

(Lawrence Summers, Former Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, July 20071)

Abstract

We examine US firm-level campaign finance contributions preceding and subsequent to equity investment by a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). Our empirical results suggest that SWFs are attracted to firms engaged in US campaign finance and that firm campaign finance contributions increase after SWF investment. SWF attraction to campaign finance firms increases (1) after an exogenous legal shock that liberalized corporate campaign finance activities, and (2) in a subset of industries vulnerable to recent legislation capable of inhibiting or expunging foreign investment. We provide some of the first evidence consistent with political motives for SWF investment in the United States.

Résumé

Nous étudions les contributions des entreprises au financement des campagnes américaines avant et après l’investissement de capitaux par un fonds souverain (FS). Nos résultats empiriques suggèrent que les FS sont attirés par des entreprises engagées dans le financement de campagnes américaines et que les contributions au financement des campagnes américaines augmentent après l’investissement de FS. L’attrait pour les entreprises qui financent des campagnes augmente (1) après un choc légal exogène qui libéralise les activités de financement de campagnes par les entreprises et (2) dans un sous-ensemble de secteurs d’activité vulnérables à la législation récente capable d’empêcher ou de supprimer les investissements étrangers. Nous livrons les premières preuves qui sont cohérentes avec les motifs politiques pour l’investissement de FS aux Etats-Unis.

Resumen

Examinamos las contribuciones financieras de las empresas Estadounidenses precedentes y posteriores a la inversión por un fondo soberano de riqueza (SWF). Nuestros resultados empíricos sugieren que los fondos soberanos de riqueza son atraídos por las empresas que participaron en la financiación de campañas en los Estados Unidos y que las contribuciones financieras de una empresa aumentan después de la inversión a fondos soberanos. La atracción de fondos soberanos de riqueza a las empresas que financian campañas aumenta (1) después de una choque legal exógeno que liberaliza las actividades corporativas de financiación de campañas, y (2) en un subconjunto de industrias vulnerables a legislación reciente capaz de inhibir o eliminar la inversión extranjera. Damos algunas de las primeras evidencias consistentes con las motivaciones políticas de inversión a fondos soberanos de riqueza en los Estados Unidos.

Resumo

Examinamos as contribuições financeiras para campanhas americanas ao nível de empresa anteriores e subsequentes ao investimento de capital por um fundo de riqueza soberano (SWF). Nossos resultados empíricos sugerem que os SWFs são atraídos para firmas envolvidas no financiamento de campanhas americanas e que as contribuições financeiras para campanhas das firmas aumentam após o investimento de SWF. A atração de SWF para firmas com financiamento de campanhas aumenta (1) após um choque exógeno legal que liberou as atividades corporativas de financiamento de campanhas, e (2) em um subconjunto de indústrias vulneráveis à legislação recente capaz de inibir ou eliminar o investimento estrangeiro. Fornecemos algumas das primeiras evidências consistentes com motivos políticos para o investimento de SWF nos Estados Unidos.

概要

我们研究美国企业层面主权财富基金(SWF)股权投资前后的竞选融资捐赠。我们的实证研究结果表明,SWFs对从事美国竞选融资的公司有吸引力,且公司竞选融资捐款在SWF投资后增加。SWF对竞选融资公司的吸引力在如下情况下会增加:(1)在一个外生的法律冲击使公司竞选融资活动自由化之后,以及(2)在一个易受能抑制或清除外商投资的近期立法影响的行业子集里。我们提供了一些与在美国的SWF投资政治动机一致的首次证据。

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Acknowledgements

We acknowledge very helpful and constructive comments on the manuscript from Douglas Cumming (the editor) and three anonymous referees. We also thank Paul Avey, Matthew Boland, Gordon Clark (discussant), Matthew Cobabe, Arthur Denzau, James Downes, Bowe Hansen, Christie Hayne, April Knill, Lynnette Purda, David Reeb, Lukas Roth, Steve Salterio, Elvira Sojli, Mike Welker, participants at the Journal of International Business Studies paper development conference and workshop participants at Virginia Tech for helpful comments. We are grateful to the CPA Centre for Governance at the Smith School of Business for funding the purchase of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute SWF Transaction Database used in this study.

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Correspondence to David Godsell.

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Supplementary information accompanies this article on the Journal of International Business Studies website (www.palgrave.com/journals) Accepted by Douglas Cumming, Guest Editor, on 20 September 2016. This article has been with the authors for two revisions.

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Calluzzo, P., Nathan Dong, G. & Godsell, D. Sovereign wealth fund investments and the US political process. J Int Bus Stud 48, 222–243 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-016-0057-5

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