In social interactions, individuals are often tempted to ‘free ride’ (benefit without paying) on other group members’ contributions. A new mathematical framework suggests a strategy based on cumulative reciprocity that can help to sustain mutual cooperation.
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This is a summary of: Li, J. et al. Evolution of cooperation through cumulative reciprocity. Nat. Comput. Sci. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43588-022-00334-w (2022).
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Cumulative reciprocity can sustain cooperation in repeated social interactions. Nat Comput Sci 2, 709–710 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s43588-022-00335-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43588-022-00335-9
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