The assumption of rationality is at the heart of action explanations. A Bayesian model of theory of mind, which explicitly relies on this assumption, can predict with high accuracy the inferences that people make about the mental states underlying others’ actions.
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Csibra, G. Cognitive science: Modelling theory of mind. Nat Hum Behav 1, 0066 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0066
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0066
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