An experiment studying people's willingness to sacrifice personal gains so that resources are passed to future generations shows that this occurs only when extractions by free-riders are curbed by majority rule. See Letter p.220
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Putterman, L. A caring majority secures the future. Nature 511, 165–166 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/nature13510
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nature13510
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