Abstract
We have shown that, if a system of indirect reciprocity is stable, exclusion from that system could deter collective-action cheats1. Unlike direct punishment2,3,4,5, indirect punishers benefit by avoiding donation, obviating the second-order free-rider problem. Fowler claims6, however, that we assume away the second-order free-rider problem, and (by adding a new error term) argues that indirect-reciprocity defectors undermine cooperation.
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Panchanathan, K., Boyd, R. Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply). Nature 437, E8–E9 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04202
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04202
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