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Physical Constituents of Qualia

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Abstract

In this paper I propose a defense of a posteriori materialism.Problems with a posteriori identity materialism are identified,and a materialism based on composition, not identity, is proposed.The main task for such a proposal is to account for the relationbetween physical and phenomenal properties. Composition does notseem to be fit as a relation between properties, but I offer apeculiar way to understand property-composition, based on somerecent ideas in the literature on ontology. Finally, I propose amaterialist model for the mind-body relation that is able to resistthe attack from conceivability arguments.

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Authors
  1. István Aranyosi
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Aranyosi, I. Physical Constituents of Qualia. Philosophical Studies 116, 103–131 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000005733.01648.95

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000005733.01648.95

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