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The formalising tendency in philosophy and experimental psychology

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Abstract

This paper is an exercise in the phenomenology of science. It examines the tendency to prefer formal accounts in a familiar body of experimental psychology. It will argue that, because of this tendency, psychologists of this school neglect those forms of human cognition typical of the humanities disciplines. This is not a criticism of psychology, however. Such neglect is compatible with scientific rigour, provided it does not go unnoticed. Indeed, reflection on the case in hand allows us to refine the characterisation of the “formalising tendency”.

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  1. University of Hertfordshire, UK E-mail

    Brendan Larvor

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  1. Brendan Larvor
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Larvor, B. The formalising tendency in philosophy and experimental psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2, 337–352 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007367.10157.a3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007367.10157.a3

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