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An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism

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Abstract

This article argues that attitudinal hedonism is false as atheory of what is intrinsically good for us because it impliesthat nothing is intrinsically good for someone who does nothave the psychological capacity for the propositional attitudeof enjoyment even if he has other important mental capacitiesthat humans have.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, 85287-2004, USA

    Peter de Marneffe

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  1. Peter de Marneffe
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de Marneffe, P. An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 115, 197–200 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025030803776

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025030803776

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