Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats May Be

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

    We’re sorry, something doesn't seem to be working properly.

    Please try refreshing the page. If that doesn't work, please contact support so we can address the problem.

Abstract

Hilary Putnam has offered two arguments to show that we cannotbe brains in a vat, and one to show that our cognitive situationcannot be fully analogous to that of brains in a vat. The latterand one of the former are irreparably flawed by misapplicationsof, or mistaken inferences from, his semantic externalism; thethird yields only a simple logical truth. The metaphysical realismthat is Putnam’s ultimate target is perfectly consistent withsemantic externalism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, 513 Agnes Arnold Hall, Houston, TX, 77204-3004, USA

    Bredo C. Johnsen

Authors
  1. Bredo C. Johnsen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Johnsen, B.C. Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats May Be. Philosophical Studies 112, 225–249 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023075527458

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023075527458

Keywords

Search

Navigation