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Against Blameless Wrongdoing

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Abstract

I argue against the standard view that it is possible to describe extensionally different consequentialist theories by describing different evaluative focal points. I argue that for consequentialist purposes, the important sense of the word ‘act’ must include all motives and side effects, and thus these things cannot be separated.

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Mason, E. Against Blameless Wrongdoing. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5, 287–303 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019671210369

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