Abstract
This paper attemptsto explain the process of emergence of the state. It argues thatmorality is the first institution created by human beings tomaintain social order. But social order based on morality breaksdown when the human group becomes too large. When that occurs,most groups tend to split. Some groups, however, are able todevelop a hierarchical structure that allows them to escape thatfate. Political leadership is described as the result of a socialcontract. It is argued that this contract undergoes an essentialchange along the process of consolidation of statehood. At someinitial stage, it can be regarded as a “consent contract,”but, later on, it becomes a “duress contract.” This processis related to three main causes: population growth, increasingeconomic interdependence and geographic confinement. Other topicsdiscussed in the paper are the origins of private property rights,the emergence of autocratic governments, and the origins of democracy.
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Molinero, J.M.S. The Origins of the State from Reciprocity to Coercive Power. Constitutional Political Economy 11, 231–253 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009004906543
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009004906543