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Cognition Is Not Computation: The Argument from Irreversibility

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Abstract

The dominant scientific and philosophical view of the mind – according to which, put starkly, cognition is computation – is refuted herein, via specification and defense of the following new argument: Computation is reversible; cognition isn't; ergo, cognition isn't computation. After presenting a sustained dialectic arising from this defense, we conclude with a brief preview of the view we would put in place of the cognition-is-computation doctrine.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Philosophy, Psychology & Cognitive Science, Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, 12180

    Selmer Bringsjord

  2. Dept. of Philosophy, Psychology & Cognitive Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, 12180

    Michael Zenzen

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  1. Selmer Bringsjord
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  2. Michael Zenzen
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Bringsjord, S., Zenzen, M. Cognition Is Not Computation: The Argument from Irreversibility. Synthese 113, 285–320 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005019131238

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