Abstract
Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.
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Eells, E., Fitelson, B. Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support. Philosophical Studies 107, 129–142 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014712013453
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014712013453