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Market Transparency and Collusion: On the UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange

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Abstract

We review the decision by the European Commission in the case of the UK Agricultural Registration Exchange. We propose a theoretical model, offering a basis for some of the intuitive arguments used by the Commission on the anti-competitive role of information exchange in the case of price and non price collusion. Market transparency on non price data is shown to be a collusion facilitating device which may achieve stability in otherwise unstable cartels.

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Georgantzís, N., Sabater-Grande, G. Market Transparency and Collusion: On the UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange. European Journal of Law and Economics 14, 129–150 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016554808648

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016554808648

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