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Editorial Introduction

  • Editorial Introduction
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Abstract

I survey some important semantical and axiomatic theories of self-referential truth. Kripke's fixed-point theory, the revision theory of truth and appraoches involving fuzzy logic are the main examples of semantical theories. I look at axiomatic theories devised by Cantini, Feferman, Freidman and Sheard. Finally some applications of the theory of self-referential truth are considered.

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Halbach, V. Editorial Introduction. Studia Logica 68, 3–20 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011933220835

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