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A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle

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Abstract

The generality principle advocated by Buchanan and Congleton (1998), stating that only legislation which treats all citizens equally as citizens is permissible, is normally motivated on contractarian grounds. It is shown that the generality principle can also be motivated on preference-utilitarian grounds. This is in line with Hayek (1960), who defends the rule of law by reference to consequentialist considerations. Using Hare's (1981) terminology, on a critical level we realize that everyday political decisionmaking tends to generate rash and non-general outcomes and that a rule limiting the action space of politicians can induce a higher degree of total preference satisfaction.

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  1. The City University of Stockholm, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42, Stockholm, Sweden

    Niclas Berggren

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Berggren, N. A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle. Constitutional Political Economy 10, 339–353 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009070916284

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