Abstract
We show that wage-taxfinanced subsidies encourage investment in risky education andoffer welfare gains. Tax competition and labour mobility maylead to substantial erosion of regional taxation. On the otherhand, mobility insures against region-specific shocks encouraginginvestment in education. Thus, welfare effects on the educatedand the owners of the fixed factor may go in either direction.Tax competition is especially fierce if the governments careabout the owners of the fixed factor. Elimination of their interestsfrom the governments' objective functions results in a Pareto-improvementin a federation with tax competition.
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Poutvaara, P. Education, Mobility of Labour and Tax Competition. International Tax and Public Finance 7, 699–719 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008733527427
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008733527427