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Private Antitrust Enforcement at a Roundabout

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Abstract

Private enforcement of EC competition law has reached a new stage with the publication of the European Commission’s Green Paper entitled ‘Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’. Even though it is unclear whether any legislative action at the Community level will follow, the Green Paper has triggered a lively debate. Private enforcement faces a number of external challenges, such as the possibility of introducing a ‘plea bargaining system’ into EC competition law, the ‘more economic approach’ and coordination with public enforcement. Private enforcement is furthermore beset with a number of intrinsic difficulties, the passing-on problem arguably being the central one. This article attempts to find a solution to that problem, i.e., to the difficulties raised by the passing-on of damages through the various levels of the distribution chain. After evaluating the options proposed by the European Commission in its Green Paper, it comes to the conclusion that a ‘factor approach’ is the most appropriate. A draft provision for potential secondary EC legislation addressing the passing-on problem is offered, attempting to reconcile the insights of economic theory with the exigencies of civil litigation in the courthouse. This provision stipulates the unavailability of the passing-on defence against direct purchasers unless the direct purchaser has entered into a fixed-quantity, cost-plus contract with his purchaser. Indirect purchasers are entitled to damages provided there is no break in the chain of causation. Their damages should be quantified on the basis of the price difference at the direct purchaser level, i.e., the difference between the price actually paid by the direct purchaser and the hypothetical price the direct purchaser would have paid but for the cartel. This amount is multiplied by a certain factor (fraction) taking into account the likely pass-on rate.

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References

  1. COM (2005) 672 final, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/index_en.html.

  2. Green Paper, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 3.

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  13. This approach is exemplified by the case-by-case approach stipulated, e. g., by Commission Notice — Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ 2000 C 291/1; Commission Notice — Guidelines on the applicability of Art. 81 of the EC-Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, OJ 2001 C 2; DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Art. 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, December 2005, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf. Cf., E.J. Mestmäcker, ‘Interdependenz von Recht und Ökonomie’, in Monopolkommission, ed., Zukunftsperspektiven der Wettbewerbspolitik (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2005) p. 19; W. Möschel, ‘Juristisches versus ökonomisches Verständnis eines Rechts der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen’, in E. Keller, C. Plassmann and A. von Falck, eds., Festschrift für Winfried Tilmann (Cologne, Heymann 2003) p. 705.

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  16. For a quantitative study with further references, cf., M. Bloom, ‘Immunity/Leniency/Financial Incentives/Plea Bargaining’, in Ehlermann and Atanasiu, op. cit. n. 12.

  17. Cf., Green Paper, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 3, option 6.

  18. Cf., Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, 188 Stat. 661 (2004) section 213(a) for this requirement as a precondition for de-trebling damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (section 4(a) Clayton Act) in case of defendants successfully applying for leniency.

  19. As suggested by Böge, President of the Bundeskartellamt, the German competition authority, at the Conference ‘Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law’ held at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, on 6 and 7 April 2006; and Green Paper, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 11, option 30.

  20. As suggested by Monopolkommission, ‘Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-Novelle, Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB’, in ibid., Sondergutachten 41/42 (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2004) 7, para. 75 and as contemplated by option 16 of the Green Paper, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 3.

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  24. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918).

  25. See: http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/indirect_purchaser.htm.

  26. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 1856 (2002). See: http://www.amc.gov.

  27. On the consequences of the reform for private enforcement, cf., W.-H. Roth, ‘Das Kartelldeliktsrecht in der 7. GWB-Novelle’, in T. Baums, et al., eds., Festschrift für Ulrich Huber zum 70. Geburtstag (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2006) p. 1133; T. Reher, ‘Kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche nach der 7. GWB Novelle für Altfälle am Beispiel des Vitaminkartells’, in N. von Verschuer and J. Gres, eds., Liber Amicorum für Alexander Riesenkampff zum 70. Geburtstag (Munich, Beck 2006) p. 113.

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  30. Cf., text after n. 46.

  31. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).

  32. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).

  33. Cf., in detail, Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 71 et seq. with extensive references.

  34. Cf., in detail, Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 281 et seq. with extensive references.

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  37. Not even by W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, ‘The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan’, 128 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1980) p. 1274, who are otherwise very critical of Harris and Sullivan’s piece. On the authors’ efforts to avoid selection bias etc., cf., Sarris, op. cit. n. 35, at p. 99 et seq.; Harris and Sullivan, loc. cit. n. 36, at p. 328 et seq.

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  38. Cf., e. g., W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, ‘Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule in Illinois Brick’, 46 University of Chicago Law Review (1979) p. 602; G. Werden and M. Schwartz, ‘Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations’, 35 Hastings Law Review (1984) p. 629; J. Benston, ‘Indirect Purchasers’ Standing to Claim Damages in Price Fixing Antitrust Actions: A Benefit/Cost Analysis of Proposals to Change the Illinois Brick Rule’, 55 Antitrust Law Journal (1986) p. 213.

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  39. Cf., Crehan v. Courage, loc. cit. n. 6, para. 26 [emphasis added].

  40. ECJ, Joined Cases C-295/04, C-296/04, C-297/04 and 298/04, decided on 13 July 2006, nyr, para. 60. Cf., the case note by T. Lübbig, ‘Gleichzeitiger Verstoß gegen nationales und europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht durch Kartell — Aktivlegitimation jedes Geschädigten’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht (2006) p. 536. Manfredi is a result of the Italian car insurance cartel sanctioned by the Italian competition authority in 2000. On the ensuing Italian litigation, cf., G. Afferni and F.W. Bulst, ‘Kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche von Verbrauchern’, 13 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (2005) p. 143.

  41. Cf., in detail, Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 132 et seq. (German law), p. 166 et seq. (English law), p. 178 et seq. (French law) and p. 275 et seq. (comparing the three).

  42. Cf., S.E. Bohon, ‘Remarks, in Panel discussion: Private Actions — The Purposes Sought and the Results Achieved’, 43 Antitrust Law Journal (1973) p. 73 at p. 86 et seq. and p. 90 et seq.; E.J. Schaefer, ‘Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis’, 16 William and Mary Law Review (1975) p. 883 at p. 928; Harris and Sullivan, loc. cit. n. 36, at p. 357 et seq. For some more recent examples, cf., American Antitrust Institute, ‘Comments of the American Antitrust Institute Working Group on Remedies’ (2005) p. 18 et seq., available at: http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/423.pdf.

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  43. Cf., in detail, M.P. Schinkel, J. Tuinstra and J. Rüggeberg, Illinois Walls, working paper (2003), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=387743.

  44. For further counter-arguments to option 24 and a number of variations suggested in the past, cf., Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 334 et seq.

  45. Cf., e. g., the following US cases: Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors, 451 U.S. 557 566 et seq. (1981); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 et seq. (1946), reh’g denied, 327 U.S. 817 (1946); In re South Dakota Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 657 N.W.2d 668, 674 (South Dakota Supreme Court 2003); as well as the German Supreme Court decision BGH, 17 June 1992, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1992) p. 2753 at p. 2757 with further references to German case law.

  46. Cf., in more detail, Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 286 et seq.

  47. For a formal representation, cf., Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 288 et seq.

  48. Staff Working Paper, loc. cit. n. 1, at para. 133.

  49. For different ways of estimating profits, cf., e. g., Staff Working Paper, loc. cit. n. 1, at para. 141 (earnings-based, market-based and assets-based valuation approach).

  50. Cf., in more detail, Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 298.

  51. Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 299.

  52. Cf., e. g., Merit Brief of Appellant Maria Johnson of 19 July 2004 in front of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Johnson v. Microsoft, p. 23 et seq., available on Westlaw, document number 2004 WL 2059253. Cf., also D.R. Karon, ‘“Your Honor, Tear Down That Illinois Brick Wall!” The National Movement Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice’, 30 William Mitchell Law Review (2004) p. 1351 at p. 1357 et seq.

  53. Cf., e. g., Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington, 75 P.3d 99, 109 (Arizona Supreme Court 2003): ‘Defendants raise the concern regarding the difficulty of the proof of damages, but fail to provide examples of cases of unresolvable complexity. Our research has similarly revealed none.’ Joe Comes and Comes Vending v. Microsoft, 646 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa Supreme Court 2002): ‘We also note there is an absence of cases in which the court was faced with the impossible task of apportioning damages.’ Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., 2003-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,109, at n. 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Hyde v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 123 N.C.App. 572, 584 (N.C. App. 1996): ‘This failure to cite a single indirect purchaser case in which a court has been faced with an impossibly complex suit counsels us that a fear of complexity is not a sufficient reason to disallow a suit by an indirect purchaser…’.

  54. Cf., e. g., N. Reich, ‘The “Courage” Doctrine: Encouraging or Discouraging Compensation for Antitrust Injuries’, 42 Common Market Law Review (2005) p. 35 at p. 46.

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  55. Cf., e. g., Benston, loc. cit. n. 38, at p. 220 et seq.; Landes and Posner, loc. cit. n. 38, at p. 619 et seq.

  56. Cf., text accompanying n. 34.

  57. Cf., e. g., Harris and Sullivan, loc. cit. n. 36, at p. 315 et seq.; E.H. Mantell, ‘Denial of a Forum to Indirect-Purchaser Victims of Price Fixing Conspiracies: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick’, 2 Pace Law Review (1982) p. 153 at p. 193 et seq.; J. Cirace, ‘Apportioning Damages Between Direct and Indirect Purchasers in Consolidated Antitrust Suits: ARC America Unravels the Illinois Brick Rule’, 35 Villanova Law Review (1990) p. 283 at p. 317 et seq.; J. Cirace, ‘Price-Fixing, Privity, and the Pass-On Problem in Antitrust Treble-Damages Suits: A Suggested Solution’, 19 William and Mary Law Review (1977) p. 171 at p. 189 et seq.; Schaefer, loc. cit. n. 42, at p. 915 et seq. Cf., also L. Linder, Privatklage und Schadensersatz im Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1980) p. 168; and B. Dubow, ‘The Passing-On Defence: An Economist’s Perspective’, 24 European Competition Law Review (2003) p. 238 at p. 240. For examples of such an argument raised in practice, cf., the plaintiff’s pleadings in A & M Supply Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 654 N.W.2d 572, 604 et seq. (Michigan Court of Appeals 2002) and in Wood v. Abbott Laboratories in front of Oakland Circuit Court, available on Westlaw, document number 1997 WL 824019.

  58. Cf., e. g., P.E. Areeda and H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law — An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, 2003 Supplement (New York, Aspen 2003) p. 91 et seq., para. 346l; H.J. Hovenkamp, ‘The Rationalization of Antitrust — Review of Antitrust Law, 2nd edition, by Richard A. Posner (2001)’, 116 Harvard Law Review (2003) p. 917 at p. 940 et seq.; R.D. Blair and J.L. Harrison, ‘Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis’, 68 George Washington Law Review (1999) p. 1 at p. 29. For examples of such an argument raised in practice, cf., the plaintiffs pleadings in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 200 F.R.D. 326, 348 et seq. (E.D.Mich. 2001); In re South Dakota Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 657 N.W.2d 668, 676 et seq. (South Dakota Supreme Court 2003) and A & M Supply Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 654 N.W.2d 572, 603 and 613 et seq. (Michigan Court of Appeals 2002).

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  59. Cf., e. g., A & M Supply Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 654 N.W.2d 572, 608 et seq. (Michigan Court of Appeals 2002) on Nichols’ affidavit.

  60. Cf., e. g., the plaintiff’s pleadings in A & M Supply Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 654 N.W.2d 572, 605 et seq. (Michigan Court of Appeals 2002). On the role of regression analysis in determining antitrust damages in general, cf., ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Proving Antitrust Damages — Legal and Economic Issues (Chicago, ABA 1996) p. 145 et seq.

  61. The studies of L. Bettendorf and F. Verboven, ‘Incomplete transmission of coffee bean prices: Evidence from the Netherlands’, 27 European Journal of Agricultural Economics (2000) p. 1 and S. Borenstein, A.C. Cameron and R. Gilbert, ‘Do Gasoline Prices Respond Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes?’, 112 Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997) p. 305 are not examples to the contrary, as they are aimed at establishing the reasons for a known quantitative interdependency. In the cases at hand, not even the quantitative interdependency is a given, as both the infringer’s hypothetical selling price and the indirect purchaser’s hypothetical buying price are unknown.

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  62. Cf., in more detail, e. g., E. Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht, 2nd edn. (Cologne, Heymann 1996) p. 562 et seq.

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  63. Cf., e. g., Landes and Posner, loc. cit. n. 38, at p. 608 et seq.; W.H. Page, ‘The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations’, 37 Stan. L. Rev. (1985) p. 1445 at p. 1486.

  64. For a more detailed explanation and further arguments in favour of the factor approach, cf., Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 325 et seq.

  65. Cf., n. 45.

  66. Cf., J.C. Bartelt, Beschränkung des Schadensersatzumfangs durch das Übermaβverbot? Eine Untersuchung der Vereinbarkeit des Grundsatzes der Totalreparation (§ 249 I BGB) mit dem verfassungsrechtlichen Verhältnismäβigkeitsprinzip (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 2004).

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  67. Cf., in more detail, Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 252 et seq., with reference to the relevant ECJ case law illustrating that such limitations on liability do not fall afoul of the principle of effectiveness.

  68. Cf., Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 98 et seq. with further references.

  69. Cf., n. 31.

  70. Cf., Bulst, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 329 et seq. with further references.

  71. If desired, one may add, drawing on para. 31 of the Courage judgment (n. 6): ‘unless they bear significant responsibility for the distortion of competition’.

  72. The word ‘new’ allows for some interpretation that can take into account the specificities of a given case. Slight modifications of a good by the direct purchaser or other intermediaries can be regarded as irrelevant when making use of this room for interpretation. As set out above, general rules of causation apply. However, as the ‘modification problem’ is such a standard one, it ought to be addressed in the codification, as suggested here.

  73. Included for the sake of completeness. When competitors claim damages the passing-on problem usually does not arise.

  74. If multiple damages are to be introduced, the relevant factor is to be added here. It would, however, have to be limited to direct purchasers and suppliers (cf., section 5.6.1. above). For all other purchasers and suppliers it ought to remain 1.

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    Friedrich Wenzel Bulst Dr. iur., LL.M. (Lawyer)

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Bulst, F.W. Private Antitrust Enforcement at a Roundabout. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 7, 725–746 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752906007257

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