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A Risk-Reduction Model of Sharing: Role of Social Stimuli and Inequity

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Abstract

The present study experimentally investigated human cooperation (sharing) in a laboratory foraging task that simulated environmental variability and resource scarcity (shortfall risk). Specifically, it investigated whether a risk-reduction model of food sharing derived from the energy budget rule could predict human cooperative behavior. Participants responded on a computer task for money and were given the choice between working alone or working with others and pooling earnings. Earnings could be kept only if the sum exceeded an earnings requirement (i.e., a need level). The effects of social variables on sharing were investigated to determine whether they constrained optimal decision making. The experiments investigated choice when participants were told the partner was a computer or a (fictitious) partner (Experiment 1) and when the earnings between the participant and partner were inequitable (Experiment 2). The results showed that social variables had no effect on decision making. Instead, sharing patterns were in accord with predictions of the risk-reduction model. These results provide additional evidence that a risk-reduction model of food sharing derived from risk-sensitive foraging models may be useful for predicting human cooperation for monetary outcomes.

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Notes

  1. Choices of these participants, however, did not differ in any obvious way from choices of the other participants.

  2. Because outcomes were random it was possible that participants could get “lucky” or “unlucky” and exceed or fall below the programmed mean earnings.

  3. Choices from these participants were comparable to participants who did not doubt the social deception.

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Acknowledgments

This research was part of a doctoral dissertation by the first author and was supported by a Graduate Student Research Fund provided by the Graduate College at Western Michigan University. We would like to thank Alan Poling, Scott Gaynor, and Maarten Vonhof for their invaluable suggestions and comments and Zachary Zimmerman for his assistance with this research. Portions of these data were presented at the annual Association for Behavior Analysis International convention, Minneapolis, MN, May 2013.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown, 450 Schoolhouse Rd, Johnstown, PA, 15904, USA

    Stephanie Jimenez

  2. Western Michigan University, 1903 West Michigan Ave, Kalamazoo, MI, 49008, USA

    Cynthia Pietras

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  1. Stephanie Jimenez
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Correspondence to Stephanie Jimenez.

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Funding

This study was funded by a Graduate Student Research Fund provided by the Graduate College at Western Michigan University.

Conflict of Interest

Dr. Stephanie Jimenez and Dr. Cynthia Pietras both declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

Ethical Approval

All procedures were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.

Informed Consent

Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.

Appendix

Appendix

Instructions

You will be able to earn points by using a mouse to click letters on a computer screen.

[Today you will be participating with other people in this study. These other people also have response panels and monitors. These other people are located at another facility. When the session starts the computer will connect to the other participant’s computer.]

[Today you will be participating in the study by yourself. The computer will simulate other people in the study]

When the session starts, the letter B, the words “Press Now,” and a counter will appear on the computer screen. The counter will be at zero. Clicking on the letter B will cause the letter B and the words “Press Now” to go off the screen and will cause other letters to appear. Either the letter A, the letter C, or both letters A and C will appear. The words “Work Alone” will appear beneath the letter A and the words “Work with Others” will appear beneath the letter C. When only one letter is on the computer screen, using the mouse to click on the letter on the screen will add money to the counter. When both letters A and C are on the computer screen, you can click on either letter A or letter C. The letter you have selected will remain on the screen and the other letter will disappear. Clicking on the letter on the screen will add money to the counter. Several counters may appear on the computer screen during the session. The amount of money shown on the counter labeled “Your total earnings” is the amount you have earned during the session. Every $2.00 you earn will be exchangeable for a draw from the prize bowl. Please remain seated. When you see the words “Session Over” appear on the screen you may return to the waiting area.

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Jimenez, S., Pietras, C. A Risk-Reduction Model of Sharing: Role of Social Stimuli and Inequity. Psychol Rec 67, 11–25 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40732-016-0202-3

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