Abstract
This paper uses a 4 × 4 expansion of the Hawk–Dove Game to illustrate how sexual drift in a large genotype space can shift a population from one equilibrium in a smaller phenotype space to another. An equilibrium is only safe from being destabilized in this way when implemented by recessive alleles.
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Notes
This metaphor may perhaps help to explain some of the data offered in support of theories of punctuated equilibrium.
On the understanding that the direction of increasing fitness is up rather than down, as in the diagrams of this paper.
For example, one needs to assume that each fish encounters every other fish in each period, and that the probability of survival depends only on the payoff in the current period.
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Binmore, K. Sexual Drift. Biol Theory 8, 201–208 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-013-0103-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-013-0103-5