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The Cold War and the UN Membership of the Mongolian People’s Republic

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Abstract

The entry of Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) into the United Nations (UN), from its first application in 1946, took 15 years. In the context of the global Cold War, UN membership became a tool to strengthen the influence of the USA and the Soviet Union. They supported the membership of their respective clients, while opposed it for clients of their adversary. Consequently, from 1947 to 1955, no new members joined the organization for 8 years. However, the extension of UN membership to the newly independent African countries in the mid-1950s led to a US-Soviet struggle for allies among them. In this regard, the Soviet Union succeeded in linking the package admission of the MPR and Mauritania with the issue of China’s representation. The USA, seeking to ingratiate itself to new African UN members and thus gain their collaboration on the question of China’s representation and other UN issues crucial to American interests, ultimately compromised, consenting to the MPR’s entry. In conclusion, the MPR’s admittance was the result of the struggles and compromises of the two superpowers.

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Notes

  1. On October 20, 1945, the national plebiscite was conducted under the observation of special representatives of the ROC national government. 98.4 % of voters participated in the plebiscite and supported Outer Mongolia’s independence. In fact, the MPR’s independence was determined in advance in Yalta Agreement by the USA, the UK, and the Soviet Union and confirmed again in notes exchanged between the Soviet Union and the ROC. Therefore, a national plebiscite was virtually a procedural matter.

  2. Article 4 of Charter of the United Nations reads, “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”

  3. The question of the representation of China involved a dispute between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the ROC on which party should represent China in the Security Council and the General Assembly that had existed since the foundation of the PRC in October 1949.

  4. The British supported the admission of Transjordan into the United Nations. The Americans, in view of the Zionist movement in the USA, however, preferred to take no action in recognizing Transjordan’s independence and desired to abstain from voting on its admittance.

  5. The nine states can be divided into three types: two Soviet’s satellites (Albania and the MPR), four American-favored Western European applicants (Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden), and three Asian countries (Afghanistan, Thailand, and Transjordan).

  6. The voting result was six votes to three, with two abstentions. According to Article 4 and Article 27 of Charter of the United Nations, the new member’s application should be recommended by the Security Council to the General Assembly, and the decision of the Security Council on such matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Among nine applicants, four (Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, and Thailand) were admitted to the United Nations. The other three (Ireland, Portugal, and Transjordan) were vetoed by the Soviet Union. Albania was rejected entry into the United Nations.

  7. Some have attributed the change of the Soviet Union’s position to Stalin’s misgivings on the possible increase of America’s influence in the United Nations after the entry of the four Western European states. However, there is no direct and concrete evidence to support this argument.

  8. The case against and trial of doubtful leaders were common in East European countries: Gomulka in Poland, Paul Merker in the German Democratic Republic, Koçi Xoxe in Albania, László Rajk in Hungary, etc.

  9. The principle of the unanimity of the great powers embodied in Article 27 of Charter of the United Nations reads as the following: “Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including concurring votes of the permanent members.”

  10. The voting results on the applicants’ UN membership are as follows: Albania, three votes to four, with four abstentions; the MPR, three votes to three, with five abstentions; Transjordan, nine votes to one (the Soviet Union), with one abstention; Ireland, nine votes to one (the Soviet Union), with one abstention; and Portugal, nine votes to two (the Soviet Union and Poland), with no abstentions.

  11. On August 21, 1947, another round of votes on new applicants’ UN membership was taken, and the results were as the following: Hungary, one vote to one (USA), with nine abstentions; Italy, nine votes to one (the Soviet Union), with one abstention; Austria, eight votes to one (the Soviet Union), with two abstentions; Romania, one vote to zero, with ten abstentions; and Bulgaria, one vote to one, with nine abstentions.

  12. The Soviet-favored applicants were Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the MPR, and Romania. The American candidates included Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon (currently, The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka), Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan (former Transjordan, currently, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, and Vietnam (Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam).

  13. In November 1950, the PRC hinted that a cease-fire arrangement on the Korean War could be made if the two sides agreed on the status of Taiwan area.

  14. During World War II, Winston Churchill once proposed to organize the Continental United Nations. The Americans rejected the British proposal, while the Soviets did not express an opinion.

  15. The issue of “Continental United Nations” was only mentioned in a secret conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai and never discussed in the United Nations. Therefore, not only the ROC was totally in the dark about it, but never discussed publicly in the United Nations.

  16. Peru’s 12-state package proposal contained the following countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, and Portugal.

  17. The 11 non-Soviet applicants were Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, and Portugal. The five Soviet-sponsored candidates were Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the MPR, and Romania.

  18. The representatives of the Soviet Union and the USA at the United Nations discussed the question of membership from September 27 to October 1, 1955. The discussions, however, failed because of mistrust and suspicion.

  19. Among the 16 successful applicants, there were 12 non-Soviet states (Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, and Spain) and four Soviet-sponsored states (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania).

  20. In October 1949, the ROC broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Several months later, the Soviet Union signed The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the PRC and nullified The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance previously signed between the ROC and the Soviet Union in August 1945. Four years later, the ROC also declared to cancel that treaty. Since the MPR’s independence was based on the exchange notes attached to The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the ROC government in December 1955 considered its revocation of the treaty as abrogation of the MPR’s de jure independence and vetoed the MPR’s UN application. Subsequently, the ROC Executive Yuan declared that Outer Mongolia again became the ROC’s territory. According to the ROC’s constitution, the territory of the ROC within its existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by a resolution of the National Assembly. Therefore, the Executive Yuan’s announcement, never approved by the National Assembly, had no legal effect. Afterward, the ROC interpreted Outer Mongolia as part of its GuYouZhiJiangYu (existing national boundaries) and defined the delimitation of national territory as a significant political question.

  21. The MPR government only submitted twice its application to the United Nations, the first on June 24, 1946 and the second on October 12, 1948.

  22. In October 1960, the embassy of the MPR in New Delhi published a pamphlet named “The United Nations and the Mongolian People’s Republic” to express their thanks to Indian’s support in the United Nations on the MPR’s application and to seek supports from the Western countries.

  23. The results of the vote were as follows: (1) on Soviet’s proposal to include the MPR’s application in the agenda, four votes to five, with two abstentions, rejected; (2) on proposal to include Mauritania’s application in the agenda, nine votes to two, adopted; and (3) on Mauritania’s UN membership application, eight votes to two (the Soviet Union and Poland), with one abstention, rejected.

  24. The Brazzaville Group, an organization of French-speaking newly independent African nations, submitted a draft resolution (A/L.335) to the General Assembly, supporting Mauritania’s admission to the United Nations. Afterward, the Soviet Union made amendments to include and give priority to the MPR’s application to African’s draft resolution. The revised Soviet draft resolution (A/L.336) was soon adopted by the General Assembly. As a result, the application of the MPR was successfully linked with that of Mauritania.

  25. Since the Soviet Union vetoed Mauritania’s application in December 1960 and insisted on joint admission, the Brazzaville Group had to press other permanent members not to block the MPR’s application. There were two permanent members who maintained affirmative attitudes toward the MPR’s UN membership. The UK was prepared to support the MPR’s admittance in December 1955. France, the former suzerain of Mauritania, also expressed its support of the MPR’s UN membership.

  26. Among the 16 countries, 11 were Brazzaville Group members, i.e., Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire), Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Malagasy (Madagascar), Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal, Chad, and five other African countries (Togolese Republic, Somali, Congo (Leopoldville), Mali, and Nigeria).

  27. The voting result was 42 votes to 34, with 22 abstentions. Among the 11 new French African members, there were ten abstentions and one negative vote (Senegal). Among the other five new African members, there were two abstentions (Togolese Republic and Somali) and two opposing votes (Mali and Nigeria). The Congo (Leopoldville) did not vote. In summary, of 22 abstentions, the new African members provided 12; of 34 opposing votes, they cast three.

  28. The Casablanca countries include the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco.

  29. During the 1950s, the Americans were not concerned about the MPR apart from extremely limited economic interests. Notwithstanding the de facto approval of its independence in Yalta Conference, the United States neither recognized the MPR nor agreed its entry into the United Nations. In August 1960, the Americans again clearly stated that the MPR was not an independent or genuine state. Therefore, the USA would “oppose any effort on the part of the Soviet bloc to gain admittance into the United Nations of Outer Mongolia.”

  30. The Sino-Soviet split became more and more pronounced at the end of Eisenhower’s presidency. Although the US government had gained information on the Sino-Soviet split through the Central Intelligence Agency, they still desired more details. Thus, the MPR geographic location became considerably important. The Americans stated clearly that Ulan Bator would be a useful “listening post” to observe and evaluate differences between the Soviet Union and the PRC.

  31. The Americans suggested establishing a committee to study the question of China’s representation and the enlargement of other councils. There were two formulas on the question of China’s representation (a) “new state” formula: the PRC would be required to apply for UN membership as a new state and (b) “successor state” formula: the PRC, following the analogy of Pakistan, would be the successor State to the Republic of China that had originally joined the United Nations and that would thus be admitted as a new member.

  32. With some specific commitments of the US government, the ROC finally promised that they would abstain in the voting. The Americans made the following concessions: (a) President Kennedy made a public statement of support for the ROC in the United Nations on October 18, 1961, in following terms “The United States has always considered the Government of the Republic of China the only rightful government representing China and has always given full support to the position and to all the rights of that government in the United Nations. Therefore, the USA firmly opposes the entry of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations or into any of the components of the United Nations” and (b) President Kennedy gave the following private assurance to Chiang Kai-shek “I wish to assure you that if at any time a US veto is necessary and will be effective in preventing Chinese Communist entry into the United Nations, the United States will use that veto.”

  33. The ROC did not attend the voting and the Americans abstained in the voting.

  34. Two months later, the USA succeeded in remaining the ROC seat in the United Nations due to supports of Brazzaville Group. On American’s proposal regarding the question of China’s representation, the result of vote was 61 votes to 34, with seven abstentions. Of the additional 19 affirmative votes compared with that of 1960, the Brazzaville Group provided all 11 (Gabon was absent in the vote).

  35. After the MPR’s entry into the United Nations, the UK and France recognized that country in succession in the first half of the 1960s.

  36. The Soviet Union signed The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the MPR on January, 1966. According to the treaty, two countries would take joint action to resist any threats of aggression in Asia by imperialist. Afterward, the Soviet Union, on the one hand, dispatched more soldiers and technicians to the MPR and, on the other, expressed clearly opposition to US recognition of that country.

  37. The USA demanded the Albania government to make an acknowledgement of the continued validity of the treaties signed between Albania and the USA on April 7, 1939. The American also sent an informal US mission to Albania in 1945 to reestablish relations with Albania regime, however, failed.

  38. Soviet representative at the United Nations Gromyko stated before he vetoed Finnish application that the Soviet delegation supported the application for admission to the United Nations of Finland but would not allow one country to “be placed in a class by itself.”

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    Yi Zhang

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Zhang, Y. The Cold War and the UN Membership of the Mongolian People’s Republic. East Asia 32, 207–221 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-015-9234-6

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