The Impact of 3/11 on Japan

Abstract

The question posed in this paper is whether the triple disaster of 3/11 constitutes a “critical juncture” in Japan. We can point to minor discontinuities in Japanese policies, institutions, and identity caused by the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear plant meltdown that eventuated on March 11, 2011, but in the year following the event there was no evidence of a critical change. The disaster and post-disaster situation in Japan are summarized, and an explanation for the lack of critical change in nuclear policy—an area where change might have been expected in view of the fact that European countries reacted to 3/11 with critical changes in nuclear energy policy—is sought by comparing the ability of mainstream theories of Japanese politics to explain the situation.

Appendices

Appendix I: 3/11 Disaster Timeline by Kyodo News Service

Chronology of Major Events Related to the Nuclear Crisis [8]

Kyodo

March 11, 2011 — The magnitude 9 earthquake and subsequent tsunami cause a station blackout at the Fukushima No. 1 power plant, crippling reactors 1 through 4. The government declares an emergency and orders residents living within 3 km of the plant to evacuate.

March 12 — Prime Minister Naoto Kan inspects the plant. A hydrogen explosion rips through the No. 1 reactor building. The evacuation zone is expanded to a 10-km radius and later to 20 km.

March 14 — The No. 3 reactor building suffers a hydrogen explosion.

March 15 — A hydrogen explosion occurs in the No. 4 reactor building.

March 17 — Ground Self-Defense Force helicopters drop water to cool off spent fuel rods in the No. 3 reactor's storage pool. Fire engines spray water from the ground.

March 20 — Reactors 5 and 6 achieve cold shutdown.

April 2 — Highly radioactive water is confirmed flowing into the sea from reactor 2.

April 12 — The government raises the crisis severity level to 7, the highest on the international scale, bringing it on par with the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

April 17 — The government and Tokyo Electric Power Co. announce a two-phase road map to bring the crisis under control.

April 22 — The government designates a 20-km radius around the plant as a no-go zone, while setting a ring 20 km to 30 km from the plant as an area that will have to be evacuated if further emergencies develop. In addition, evacuation is advised but not mandatory for an area beginning at the 20-km line and stretching beyond 30 km.

June 7 — The government admits meltdowns occurred in the cores of reactors 1, 2 and 3.

June 27 — Tepco starts cooling the damaged reactors using water decontaminated through a newly installed water treatment system.

July 19 — The government and Tepco say "Step 1" of the road map is largely completed and revise the conditions for completing the second phase and containing the crisis.

Sept. 8 — New Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda visits the crippled plant for the first time.

Sept. 19 — Nuclear disaster minister Goshi Hosono announces a plan at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency to move the deadline for cold shutdown forward to the yearend instead of mid-January.

Sept. 28 — Temperatures at the bottom of the pressure vessels for reactors 1, 2 and 3 fall below 100 degrees.

Sept. 30 — The evacuation preparation zones are lifted.

Nov. 4 — The government decides to provide Tepco with ¥891 billion to help pay its massive compensation bills.

Dec. 2 — Tepco unveils an interim report on an in-house investigation blaming the accident on a tsunami of unprecedented scope, though other disclosures show it was warned in advance.

Dec. 16 — The government declares the remaining reactors are in cold shutdown, completing the road map's second phase.

Dec. 21 — The government and Tepco announce a plan to scrap reactors 1 through 4 in the next 30 to 40 years.

Dec. 26 — The government decides to reclassify the Fukushima evacuation zones into three categories, depending on radiation levels. The government's accident investigation panel says in an interim report that the government and Tepco responded poorly to the crisis.

Jan. 26 — The government announces a plan to complete decontamination work in some evacuation areas by March 2014.

Feb. 13 — The government decides to offer Tepco an additional ¥689.4 billion for compensation payments.

Feb. 28 — A private-sector panel says Kan's response to the crisis created unnecessary confusion. He made sure Tepco's staff didn't flee.

Appendix II: Radiation Exposure Risks

How Much Radiation is Dangerous? [14]

Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano had, at one point, said radiation levels near the stricken plant on the northeast coast reached as high as 400 millisieverts (mSv) an hour. That figure would be would be 20 times the annual exposure for some nuclear-industry employees and uranium miners.

* People are exposed to natural radiation of 2–3 mSv a year.

* In a CT scan, the organ being studied typically receives a radiation dose of 15 mSv in an adult to 30 mSv in a newborn infant.

A typical chest X-ray involves exposure of about 0.02 mSv, while a dental one can be 0.01 mSv.

* Exposure to 100 mSv a year is the lowest level at which any increase in cancer risk is clearly evident. A cumulative 1,000 mSv (1 sievert) would probably cause a fatal cancer many years later in five out of every 1000 persons exposed to it.

* There is documented evidence associating an accumulated dose of 90 mSv from two or three CT scans with an increased risk of cancer. The evidence is reasonably convincing for adults and very convincing for children.

* Large doses of radiation or acute radiation exposure destroys the central nervous system, red and white blood cells, which compromises the immune system, leaving the victim unable to fight off infections.

For example, a single one sievert (1,000 mSv) dose causes radiation sickness such as nausea, vomiting, hemorrhaging, but not death. A single dose of 5 sieverts would kill about half of those exposed to it within a month.

* Exposure to 350 mSv was the criterion for relocating people after the Chernobyl accident, according to the World Nuclear Association.