Yu in the Xunzi: Can Desire by Itself Motivate Action?

Abstract

This essay argues that yu 欲 (desire), in Xunzi’s view, cannot by itself motivate action. Such a clarification will also bear on our understanding of the relation between xin 心 (the heart/mind) and yu in the Xunzi. It is divided into three main sections. The first section seeks to explicate the common assumption that yu can be an independent source of motivation. In the second section, I will conduct textual analysis that challenges such an assumption and argue that only xin can by itself motivate action. In the third section, I explain that the issue of whether yu can conflict with xin is not applicable in Xunzi’s thought and extrapolate the implications that xin is always activated and that it has a natural inclination to pursue the objects of yu. For these reasons, the source of moral failure lies in xin being active in certain problematic ways.

Appendix: Discussions of Xin and Yu in the Literature

There is a large body of secondary scholarship on xin and yu in the Xunzi. Although much of the existing literature mentions xin and yu, there are only a few extended discussions of the relation between the concepts. Discussions of Xunzi’s xin and yu are usually embedded in discussions on other subject matter rather than being treated extensively as a topic in its own right. The drawback of such an approach is that when accounts of the relation between xin and yu are confined within the framework of a larger project, the explanation of these concepts tends to be rushed and hence often hides unsupported theses about both concepts and their relation. In this regard, I will highlight two difficulties associated with the usual way scholars have apprehended the subject matter.

One difficulty is that interpreters often conflate two questions in studies of Xunzi: the question of how xin and yu are related and the question of what the reason for xin’s evaluation is. Very often, discussions of the relation between the concepts xin and yu are confined within the framework of moral evaluation. For example, the argument could run along the following line: xin evaluates on the basis of how best to satisfy the overall set of yu. On occasion, xin may override immediate desires so as to better satisfy the overall set of desires. Hence, xin makes prudential choices, not moral choices. The tendency to conflate these two questions is problematic because it reveals a confusion about the distinction between two questions that are of a different nature: one concerns the nature of the relation between two concepts, the other concerns the nature of xin’s evaluation. Dealing with these questions simultaneously raises the risk of hastily dismissing one or both, hiding possible tensions in Xunzi’s thought, or generating self-validating readings of Xunzi. This is not to argue that the issue of how xin evaluates does not shed light on the issue of how xin relates to yu, or vice versa. My contention is that these two questions are important questions which each call for extensive investigation and should therefore be treated separately, on their own terms, rather than using one question to frame the answer to the other.

Another difficulty with existing interpretations about the relation between xin and yu is that interpreters are often vague in their discussions about the relation between xin and yu. One possible reason is that both concepts are laden with assumptions. This problem pertains to both Chinese and English language studies. In studies conducted in Chinese, there is a tendency to use the same Chinese term to explain an important term in the classical texts that requires extensive analysis. Such an approach usually overlooks and leaves unexamined the subtleties embedded in Xunzi’s usages of these terms. The term jie 節, for example, can be understood in at least two different senses—to control in a violent sense, or moderation in a milder sense. Each reading of “jie” will yield a significantly different interpretation of Xunzi. However, in most Chinese language studies, the same term jie is used to explain Xunzi without much analysis or elaboration. But to an English reader, it still begs the question as to which of the two senses of jie the interpreter has in mind. In this regard, English studies have the advantage of being more sensitive to the different connotations embedded in specific Chinese terms. Nonetheless, when the terms xin and yu are conveniently translated as “mind” and “desire” in English, certain assumptions inherited from Western philosophical traditions about the mind and desire will be transferred into our understanding of Xunzi’s concepts of xin and yu. Moreover, it is inviting to subsume discussions of the relation between xin and yu under the familiar Western philosophical topic of “mind and desire.” As a corollary, the guiding questions behind scholarly interpretations could well be questions that have long interested discussions of mind and desire in Western philosophical traditions; however, these questions about mind and desire are not necessarily the questions that concern Xunzi himself.

In the following, I will demonstrate the predominance of these assumptions in the literature by assessing a number of interpretations that explicitly or implicitly suggest that yu is an independent moving force that can cause action and that the relationship of xin and yu is one about whether xin allows yu as an independent moving force to cause action.¹ This overview is by no means an exhaustive review of the relevant scholarly discussions. Nonetheless, it represents some of the major discussions about the relation between xin and yu in the literature.

Homer H. Dubs, considered the first scholar to comprehensively introduce Xunzi’s thought to an English speaking audience,² claims that there is no sharp distinction between reason and emotion in Xunzi as in Plato’s division of the soul (Dubs 1966a: 52). However, he also claims that the mind is separated from desires because Xunzi divides the human “soul” into the mind and the desires. Dubs understands the relation between the xin and yu in terms of the dichotomy between reason and will, on one hand, and appetites or emotions on the other (Dubs 1966a: 171–3). Dubs also made a distinction between “principle” and “inner principle.” Based on his discussion, it seems that “principle” is derived from standards established by the sage kings, which Dubs calls “the Confucian Way,” whereas an “inner principle” is derived from yu. Dubs claims that there will be “disorderly conduct” when xin follows an inner principle and “orderly conduct” when xin follows the principle (Dubs 1966a: 173). In other words, when xin is guided by an inner principle (that is its own judgment), it gives free rein to yu to cause disorderly action. When it is guided by principle (that is the Confucian Way), xin controls yu. If this is the case, then the role of xin is simply to allow or disallow yu from motivating certain courses of action. Thus, yu is still understood by Dubs as an independent moving force capable of causing action.

Lee Yearley’s analysis of Xunzi’s xin is one of the first extended studies in English that focus on the concept of xin. He argues that there are two conflicting concepts of xin for Xunzi: xin as “director” and xin as “spectator.” For Yearley, short-term desires are “narrowly selfish desires” whereas long-term desires are “desires that take a wide view of the self’s needs” (Yearley 1980: 466). The mind as a director overcomes short-term desires in order to better satisfy long-term ones. Yearley gives the example of someone who spontaneously desires food but gives it to an elderly person because he desires to be fed when he is old. The role of the mind is to take a comprehensive long-term view of the needs and interests of the self and overrule short-term, “spontaneous” desires from taking actions that will prevent satisfaction of desire in the long run. Yearley’s interpretation has taken yu as capable of motivating action in and of itself, for it assumes that yu could pursue its objects when xin does not interfere. The other aspect of xin is as a spectator (Yearley 1980: 474). It can objectively watch the activities of yu without being in any way involved with them. Simply put, this aspect of xin is unaffected by yu. Here, Yearley reaffirms the position that xin and yu are antagonistic to each other. Yu can pursue its own objects independently of spectator xin, while spectator xin is also detached from all activities of yu. On this level, not only are xin and yu separate, they do not even interact with each other. On Yearley’s account, when there is a conflict between xin and yu, xin is simply stopping the movement of yu. Hence, xin and yu are understood as two independent moving forces and a collision between them is possible.

In David Nivison’s analysis, the relation between xin and yu in the Xunzi is understood in terms of the long-term satisfaction of desires. On this point, Nivison’s analysis is somewhat similar to Yearley’s understanding. According to Nivison, yu moves blindly toward its objects. Xin, on the other hand, can prudentially assess yu and make judgments about how yu can be best satisfied. In this sense, the reason xin stops yu is not that yu is inherently bad but that momentary satisfaction of yu will prevent long-term satisfaction of yu. Nivison states that, “our desires taken by themselves tend to lead us into conflict” and xin can modify the “[actions] that desire alone would determine” (Nivison 1996: 208–9). This shows that Nivison has taken yu as an independent moving force that can cause action. In a discussion of the senses, Nivison states specifically that “the senses’ seeking of their objects is automatic and will go forward unless the faculty of intelligent decision in us brings it to a stop or slows or redirects it” (Nivison 1996: 86).³ On this view, it seems that yu can by itself motivate a course of action, even though its movement is automatic and blind.

Antonio Cua suggests that xin can limit and transform the movement of yu. This can be observed in Cua’s discussion of the transformation of “natural desires” into “reflective desires.” For Cua, yu already has a form of expression of its own before it is regulated by xin. Cua describes this crude form of expression as “a mere biological drive” (Cua 2005: 49–50 n28). Cua gives the example of one’s natural desire for food, which has no regard for the proper ways of satisfaction that accord with ritual practices. This suggests that the “expression” of yu, for Cua, should have included the way yu seeks its objects. Without the intervention of xin, yu would motivate a course of action that pursues its objects (Cua 2005: 50). In Cua’s view, reflective desires are transformed through the exercise of second-order volition. To be more explicit, Cua is saying that the exercise of second-order volition is taken in the form of xin issuing approvals to natural desires because natural desires themselves are blind responses. The very fact that there is the requirement for “moral approval” from xin shows that yu can potentially go against xin. The task of xin, then, is to re-steer the course of yu to a track that is morally permissible. Cua’s depiction of the relation between xin and yu strongly suggests that yu can by itself seek its own objects. The role of xin is to modify the movement of yu.

In a similar vein, T.C. Kline talks about how xin can direct and transform yu into a more complex motive. Kline differs with Cua in that Kline does not regard this newly transformed motive as yu anymore. According to Kline, since this new motive does not emerge from human nature, labelling it as yu contradicts Xunzi’s definition of yu that says yu is what comes from Heaven. Although Kline is eager to distinguish the newly transformed motive from yu, he also thinks that yu alone can “lead to forms of expression that encourage chaos and conflict” and for that reason, yu should be countered and redirected (Kline 2000: 161). Kline later on explicitly argues that xin and yu are “two primary sources of motive force in the self” (Kline 2006: 239). On Kline’s interpretation the relation between xin and yu is one about two moving forces competing against each other. With learning and acculturation, one force (yu) will be redirected by another force (xin) into a proper course.

Among the above interpretations of the relation between xin and yu, there is a commonly accepted underlying tenet that both xin and yu are capable of motivating actions in their own right. Under this assumption, whether xin controls yu or redirects yu, the relation between them is essentially characterised in terms of the interaction between two independent moving forces. Indeed, Kurtis Hagen has very recently put forward an argument that is potentially compatible with my proposed interpretation. Hagen argues that, for Xunzi, basic desires cannot be changed or transformed. It is the character, rather than the desires, that needs to be transformed. According to Hagen, the basic desires combined with prudential evaluation of long-term satisfaction of desires can motivate one to a course that ultimately leads to a transformation of character. Once the character is transformed, new specific desires with appropriate objects will be derived. Xin may also disapprove certain desires if deemed inappropriate. Since both prudential assessment and approval require the involvement of xin, Hagen does not seem to think that desire by itself can motivate action. Nonetheless, unlike my interpretation, which does not understand yu as occurring at the level of motivation, Hagen still understands desires as “layers of motivation” (Hagen 2011: 54). His choices of words such as “holding [desires] in check” also hint at the view that yu can by itself motivate actions (Hagen 2011: 62). Since Hagen’s discussion of xin and yu is embedded in his discussion of reasons for following Dao, the relation between xin and yu is not entirely clear on Hagen’s account.