Die Krisis des Wissens

Abstract

From a sociological theoretical perspective the crisis of knowledge appears to be characteristic of a knowledge society in which the importance of knowledge has increased but the importance of the traditional university system has decreased. In contrast to Husserl, I do not start with the “last” questions, but with the first question: namely, how is knowledge possible? To answer this, I define learning as a communicative practice that produces knowledge. This emphasizes the distinction between knowledge and intelligence. “Intelligence” denotes problem-solving mechanisms which can be embedded in various ways: organically in genomes; technologically in instruments; and socially in the rule systems of institutions (II–III).

On this basis, the form of knowledge for the knowledge society contrasts knowledge/non-knowledge and is set against competing forms which contrast knowledge/belief or knowledge/power. The knowledge society thus stands in great need of knowledge about how to deal with ignorance or non-knowledge, particularly in order to cope with systemic risks. The use of risk models by banks serves as one example of how organizations in the knowledge society turn their dependence on knowledge and ignorance into strategies for coping with uncertainty (IV–V). Ignorance is always the corollary of knowledge. Thus, in conclusion irony and power are introduced as exemplary ways of dealing with this form of knowledge (VI–VII).