Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics of two strategies in finite population is studied by continuous probabilistic approach. Besides frequency dependent selection, mutation was also included in this study. The equilibrium probability density functions of abundance, expected time to extinction or fixation were derived and their numerical solutions are calculated as illustrations. Meanwhile, individual-based computer simulations are also done. A comparison reveals the consistency between theoretical analysis and simulations.
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Gao, M. Continuous Probabilistic Analysis to Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations. Bull. Math. Biol. 71, 1148–1159 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-009-9397-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-009-9397-7