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A survey of static and dynamic potential games

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Abstract

Potential games are noncooperative games for which there exist auxiliary functions, called potentials, such that the maximizers of the potential are also Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. Some properties of Nash equilibria, such as existence or stability, can be derived from the potential, whenever it exists. We survey different classes of potential games in the static and dynamic cases, with a finite number of players, as well as in population games where a continuum of players is allowed. Likewise, theoretical concepts and applications are discussed by means of illustrative examples.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, Universidad de Sonora, Hermosillo, 83000, Mexico

    David González-Sánchez

  2. Mathematics Department, Centro de Investigación y de Estudios Avanzados del Instituto Politécnico Nacional, Mexico City, 07000, Mexico

    Onésimo Hernández-Lerma

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  1. David González-Sánchez
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González-Sánchez, D., Hernández-Lerma, O. A survey of static and dynamic potential games. Sci. China Math. 59, 2075–2102 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11425-016-0264-6

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