Abstract
One problem that has formed the focus of much recent discussion on personal identity is the Fission Problem. The aim of this paper is to offer a novel solution to this problem.
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Notes
For a description of some of the empirical evidence that the severing of the corpus callosum results in two independent spheres of consciousness, see R. W. Sperry, “Hemisphere deconnection and unity in conscious awareness”, American Psychologist, vol. 23 (pp. 723–733), especially p. 724.
See Sperry, op cit.
For a statement of Williams’ views, see his. (1956–1957). “Personal identity and individuation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 57, 229–252.
One exposition of Swinburne’s is given in Shoemaker, S. and Swinburne, R. G. (1984). Personal Identity. Oxford: Blackwell.
See Parfit’s Reasons and Persons. (1984). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Parfit develops his views on personal identity especially on pp. 245–280.
See David Lewis “Survival and identity” in Lewis’ (1983). Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, (pp. 55–72). Oxford: Oxford University Press. A view similar to Lewis’ has recently been defended by Eugene Mills, “Dividing without reducing: Bodily fission and personal identity.” in. (1993). Mind, vol. 102, (pp. 37–51).
For one defence of the possibility of time-travel, see D. Lewis “The paradoxes of time travel” in, (1976) American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 13, (pp. 145–52). I think it is fair to say that most subsequent discussion of the topic has tended to agree with Lewis that time travel is possible. But for a recent statement of a contrary view, see William Grey, “Troubles with time travel”, (1999). Philosophy, vol. 74, (pp. 55–71). For a reply to Grey, see Phil Dowe, “The case for time travel”, (2000), Philosophy, vol. 75, (pp. 441–452).
The notion of one part of a personal world line being downwind of another can be defined in a number of ways. Perhaps the most obvious way appeals to the idea of a ‘mark’. A stream of water will carry a ‘mark’, such as a quantity of dye, downstream of the point at which the dye enters the water. We can use this to explicate the idea that one stage of a person is downwind of another stage. Suppose that Dr Who travels from the year 2010 to 1800. Shortly before stepping in to time machine in the year 2010, he has a large glass of whisky. When he gets out of his time machine in 1800, he is sozzled. His body has carried the mark of the whisky from 2010 to 1800. Therefore, the stage of Dr Who in 1800 is downwind of the stage of Dr Who in 2010, despite the fact that it occurs before the latter in time. Another way of explicating the idea of one stage of a person being downwind of another might appeal to the person’s subjective experience of time: although the event of Dr Who stepping out of his time machine in 1800 occurs before the event of him stepping in to it in 2010, from the point of view of Dr Who’s own subjective experience, the former event seems to occur after the latter.
This type of difficulty was raised by Robert C. Coburn in his article “Personal identity revisited” in, (1985), Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 15 (pp. 379–403), especially pp. 386–387.
See Parfit’s Reasons and Persons, pp. 246–248.
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Wright, J. Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel. Philosophia 34, 129–142 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-006-9019-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-006-9019-7