Abstract
Social choice models usually assume that choice occurs among exogenously given and non-decomposable alternatives. On the contrary, choice is often among objects that are constructed by individuals or institutions as complex bundles made up of many interdependent components. In this paper we present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriately changing these bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained, depending upon initial conditions and agenda; that intransitive cycles and median voter dominance may be made to appear or disappear; and that decidability may be ensured by increasing manipulability or viceversa.
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Marengo, L., Pasquali, C. The construction of choice: a computational voting model. J Econ Interact Coord 6, 139–156 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-011-0080-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-011-0080-3