Abstract
This paper compares the doxastic credentials of the claim that nothing comes from nothing with the doxastic credentials of the claim that there is no causing without changing. I argue that comparison of these two claims supports my contention that considerations about causation do nothing to make theism more attractive than naturalism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Craig W (1979) The Kalām cosmological argument. Macmillan, London
Dawes G (2009) Theism and explanation. Routledge, New York
Fales E (2010) Divine intervention: metaphysical and epistemological puzzles. Routledge, London
Johnston M (2009) Saving God: religion after idolatry. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Kenny A (1969) The five ways: St. Thomas aquinas’ proofs of God’s existence. Routledge, Abingdon
Koons R (2000) Realism regained: an exact theory of causation, teleology and mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford
O’Connor T (2008) Theism and ultimate explanation: the necessary shape of contingency. Blackwell, Oxford
Oppy G (2010) Uncaused beginnings. Faith Philos 27:61–71
Oppy G (2011) O’Connor’s cosmological argument. Oxf Stud Philos Relig 3:166–186
Oppy G (2012) God. In: Manson N, Barnard R (eds) The continuum companion to metaphysics. Continuum, London, pp 245–267
Oppy G (2013) The best argument against God. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke
Oppy G (2014) Describing gods: an investigation of divine attributes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Oppy G (2015) “Uncaused beginnings” revisited. Faith Philos 32:205–210
Saunders N (2002) Divine action and modern science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Oppy, G. Divine Causation. Topoi 36, 641–650 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9393-0
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9393-0