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Conservative Stable Standards of Behavior and φ-Stable Sets

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Abstract

Within Luo’s (2001, J. Math. Econ. 36, 95–109) framework of a general system, I establish an equivalence theorem for the conservative stable standard of behavior (CSSB for short) developed by J. Greenberg (“The Theory of Social Situation: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach,” Cambridge University Press, 1990). It is shown that a standard of behavior for a situation is a CSSB if, and only if, its graph is a φ-stable set for the associated general system.

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  1. Academia Sinica, Institute of Economics, Nankang, Taipei, 115, Taiwan, ROC

    Xiao Luo

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  1. Xiao Luo
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Correspondence to Xiao Luo.

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Luo, X. Conservative Stable Standards of Behavior and φ-Stable Sets. Theor Decis 60, 395–402 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-4749-8

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