Abstract
An explicitly frame related interpretation of a very general more for less result is used to establish a correspondingly general class of frame related switching results. These are used in turn to show how preference reversals of kinds found by Allais and others may not only be essentially non-paradoxical in character, but can be expected to be frequently observed, even under conditions of certainty and of complete information.
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Ryan, M.J. Framing, Switching and Preference Reversals. Theor Decis 57, 181–211 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-0281-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-0281-0